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The American University in Cairo
ABSTRACT
Detecting Malicious VBScripts Using Anomaly Host Based IDS
Based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
By: Racha Mohamed El Sokkary
Thesis Supervisors: Dr. Sherif El Kassas
Prof. Dr. Amr Goneid
Department of Computer Science, AUC
Intrusion detection research over the last twenty years has focused on the threat of
individuals illegally hacking into systems. Nowadays, intrusion threat to computer
systems has changed radically. Instead of dealing with hackers, most current works
focus on defending the system against code-driven attacks. Today’s web script codes
such as VBScript are receiving increasing focus as a backdoor for attacking many
computers through e-mail attachments or infected web sites. The nature of these
malicious codes is that they can spread widely causing serious damages to many
applications. Moreover, the majority of anti-virus tools used today are able to detect
known attacks but are unable to detect new and unknown attacks.
The work in this thesis presents an Anomaly host based Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) that provides protection against web attacks from malicious VBScripts. The
core of the system treats anomalies as outliers and this IDS model uses a Multivariate
Statistical technique, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the
dimensionality of the problem while keeping the major principal components of
benign instances. Hence, the system can easily filter malicious scripts that deviate
from normal behavior and allow for normal scripts to bypass; so any future or
unknown VBScript attacks are effectively captured while maintaining a low rate of
false alarms.
v
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Chapter1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction
Computer security aims to protect an organization valuable’s resources from
unauthorized access, tampering of data, and denial of service. One broad definition of a
secure computer system is given by Garfinkel and Spafford [7] as “the one that can be
depended upon to behave as it is expected to”. This concept can be referred to as trust : a
system can be trusted if it can preserve and protect its data.
Another important definition used is that security process can be grouped into three
distinct phases, such as prevention, detection, and response [39].
•

Prevention: is the first line of defense for capturing known threats and preventing
malicious attacks.

•

Detection: is a continual reporting and monitoring for the appearance of new
threats.

•

Response: is the immediate action to minimize damage by locating and
neutralizing the source of threats.

Thus, a secure computer system is based on the realization of confidentiality, integrity,
and availability [4]:
•

Confidentiality requires that information be accessible only to those authorized for
it.

•

Integrity requires that information remain unaltered by accident or malicious
attempts.

•

Availability means that the computer system remains working without denial of
access and provides resources to authorized users when they need it.

Despite the widespread of computer use in the current information era with the
proliferation of applications that progressively depend on e-commerce; most deployed
6

computer systems have become vulnerable to various kinds of attacks and break-ins.
Attacks on Computer infrastructures have become a serious problem as they cause
various types of damages and significant losses ranging from harming database integrity
to destroying entire computer systems. According to Dorothy Denning in [1], most
existing systems have security flaws that render them susceptible to intrusions,
penetrations, and other forms of abuse. Threats to computer security can be categorized
as in [22] to errors and omissions 1 , fraud and theft 2 , malicious hackers3 , and malicious
codes4 .

As a society, the rapid access and processing of information over the Internet has
exacerbated the problem of unauthorized access and tampering with data. Furthermore,
network connectivity has increased the number and severity of these attacks. It not only
provides access to larger and varied resources of data, but also provides an access path to

1

These are important threats to data and systems’ integrity. Users, data entry clerks, and systems’ operators make

errors that crash a system and create vulnerabilities .

2

Individuals may use a computer to steal small amounts of money from large financial accounts. Financial

systems are not the only ones at risk. Systems that control access to any material or informational resources are
targets such as, inventory and school grading systems. Computer fraud and theft can be committed both by
insiders (authorized users of the system) or outsiders.

3

The term malicious hackers, sometimes called crackers, refer to those who break into computers without

authorization. Much of the rise of hackers’ activity is often attributed to increase in connectivity in both
government and industry. The hacker threat should be considered in terms of current and potential future damage.
Although current losses due to hackers’ attacks are significantly smaller than losses due to insiders’ theft and
sabotage, the hacking problem is becoming more serious.
4

Malicious code refers to Viruses, Worms, and Trojans that can attack both personal computers and other

platforms. Viruses and worms do not need human intervention and are capable of replicating to other systems. By
the time they are discovered, it may be impossible to trace their origin or the extent of the infection. Trojan horses
by definition do not replicate, and are programmed to perform destructive activities triggered by a condition
precompiled in its program. Actual costs attributed to the presence of malicious code results in system outages and
wasting time repairing the systems.

7

the data from virtually anywhere on the network making the data residing on computer
systems vulnerable to theft and corruption [11].

Nowadays, most intruders have become skilled at determining and exploiting
systems’ weaknesses to increase privileges of systems’ attacks. Damaging
intrusions can occur in a matter of seconds by overcoming the password
authentication mechanisms designed to protect systems. Moreover, intruders can
hide their presence by installing modified versions of system monitoring and
administration commands and by erasing their tracks in audit logs [2], [11]. The
following Figure 1. 1 describes the history of attacks and illustrates the relationship
between the relative sophistication of attacks and attackers from the 1980’s to the
present. The knowledge required by intruders to launch known methods of attacks
is decreasing. Today anyo ne can attack a network due to the widespread and easy
availability of intrusion tools [11].

Figure 1. 1 : Attack sophistication versus intruder technical knowledge [11].

Recently trends indicate that the most costly intrusions are being perpetrated by mobile
codes rather than individual hack- in attempts. The need for dynamic content and featurerich Web sites over the Internet has led to the adoption of mobile codes such as Java
applets, Activex controls, and Script codes (e.g. Java script, VBScript, .. etc.) [23].
8

However, these mobile codes present a serious security threat today that merits
considerable attention and resources to counteract. Security flaws and holes have been
discovered in virtually every single mobile code platform, making the outcomes of their
execution involve system modifications, Invasion of privacy, and denial of service [10].

One class of these mobile code threats that has proven particularly powerful and
troublesome is malicious script codes. They are developed in scripting language, such as
VBScript; they run on their respective interpreters residing in Web browsers or MS
Office applications causing serious damages to various applications. Moreover, these
attack scripts can provide hackers an easy back door entrance into the system by tricking
unwitting users into downloading them from infected e- mail and web sites. In August,
2000, four of the top six malicious code threats on Symantec's Antiviral Research
Center's Web page [21] were active-scripting based attacks, including: VBS.Stages.A,
Wscript.KakWorm, VBS.LoveLetter, and VBS.Network [23].
These forms of malicious VBScripts are really the new types of intrusion; simply
disabling their capabilities in browsers and mailers will not adequately address the
problem because active scripting is used pervasively in most Web pages. That’s why
VBScript was chosen as an important area to investigate and focus on in this research.

Several layers of defense are used to capture malicious scripts while they are acting
against the system. Firewalls 5 , security patches 6 , and virus scanners 7 are examples of

5 It is a system designed to prevent unauthorized access to or from a private network. Firewalls can be
implemented in both hardware and software, or a combination of both. Firewalls are frequently used to prevent
unauthorized Internet users from accessing private networks connected to the Internet, especially intranets. All
messages entering or leaving the intranet pass through the firewall, which examines each message and blocks
those that do not meet the specified security criteria [5], [6].

6 Security patches are operating systems updates to fix the security holes that malicious software exploits.
Traditionally, security patches were reactively developed to address known security holes detected by attacks on
the operating system. Nowadays, O/S developers employ systematic testing methodologies to discover and
mitigate the system security. Similar to virus scanners, security patches protect systems only when they have
been written, distributed and applied to host systems. Until then, systems remain vulnerable and attacks can
spread widely [19].
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these primary lines of defenses used to protect information systems from breaches and
intrusions [37], [39].

In many environments, Virus scanners are used to protect against these malicious mobile
codes. Commercial virus scanners are mostly signature based using embedded strings in
software to identify malicious from benign code [21], [37]. The main drawback of virus
scanners is that they are effective against known attacks but are unable to effectively
detect and prevent new types of attacks. Therefore, virus scanners require frequent
updating of their signature databases; otherwise the scanners become useless [37]. Today
many virus scanners employ a combination of heuristics to detect viruses. The heuristics
can be put into two categories: Static heuristics and dynamic heuristics [41]. Static
heuristics 8 go through a file by analyzing its structure, and architecture as well as some
indicators from its code to determine the likelihood of an infection. On the other hand,
dynamic heuristics 9 set up a controlled virtual environment in which they run the program
and observe its behavior to see if there is any malicious activity. The technique of
maintaining a virus signature database and then checking all files against it, works pretty
well for known viruses but fairs poorly against new ones simply because chances are that
they would not match any of the known patterns. Thus, heuristic anti- virus software is
only as good as its signature database is kept updated of new viruses [42], [43].

Computer systems are likely to remain insecure for sometime; therefore, security
measures must be taken in order to detect break-ins. This motivates the need for
improving detection by developing more secure systems that are resilient to attacks.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) fill this role and usually form the last line of defense
against security breaches. They are useful not only in detecting successful break- ins, but

7 A type of antivirus program that searches a system for virus signatures that have attached to executable
programs and applications such as e-mail clients. A virus scanner can either search all executables when a
system is booted or scan a file only when a change is made to the file as viruses will change the data in a file.
8 For static heuristics, signatures are code segments of already known viruses and other patterns of malicious
virus like code.

9 For dynamic heuristics, signatures are malicious requests to the operating system for patterns of malicious
activity.
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also in monitoring attempts to breach security. Thus, they provide important information
for timely countermeasures [2].
Existing intrusion detection techniques fall in two major categories: Misuse detection
(also referred to as Signature recognition), and Anomaly detection.
Misuse detection is similar to Virus Scanners; they also make use of signature scanning
by looking for unique data fingerprints that identify certain types of attacks. The
weakness of this approach is that it cannot detect novel attacks whose signatures are
unknown. On the other hand, Anomaly detection detects both known and novel intrusions
by establishing a profile of normal behavior and observing any abnormal deviation from
this behavior [12].

The goal of this research is to provide protection against web script attacks from
malicious VBScripts. Thus, this significant limitation of misuse detection was tackled in
this research by focusing on the use of Anomaly host based IDS, so the system can easily
detect VBScripts with malicious behavior onto the host and allow for normal scripts to
bypass while reducing the rate of false alarms.
A key benefit of the introduced approach is that it handles a class of malicious VBScript
attacks rather than specific instances, i.e. it is not a signature-based detection. As a result,
it addresses future and unknown active scripting attacks. Moreover, its capability is
demonstrated to detect unknown VBScript attacks in emails attachments and Web
programs.

Another advantage is that the proposed anomaly host based IDS uses a Multivariate
statistical technique, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [57], to reduce the problem
dimensionality by identifying patterns of benign behavior and expressing the data in such
a way to highlight their similarities and differences. Thus, the IDS could easily
differentiate between normal and malicious VBScripts, and capture any future malicious
scripts that exhibit different or abnormal profile.
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1.2 Problem Statement
It has been noticed over the past few years that the number of attacks based on malicious
VBScripts has increased dramatically, making it one of the main threats to web based
systems [10]. Recently there have been some high profile incidents with malicious e- mail
attachments such as I LOVE YOU [40], [67], Slammer [65], and Netsky [66] viruses and
their clones. These malicious VBScripts are simply transmitted as a source code in e- mail
or web sites and run on the fly causing serious damages to powerful applications such as
word processing, and web programs. This fact implies that VBScript codes are receiving
increasing focus for attacking many computers and it is significant to provide protection
against attacks from malicious VBScripts. Hence, the main problem addressed by this
thesis is to develop an anomaly host based IDS that uses a multivariate statistical
technique such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to detect attacks from malicious
VBScripts.

1.3 Thesis Objective
The work presented in this thesis will address an area that received little attention despite
its growing importance, namely, the increasing number of attacks utilizing security
vulnerabilities in VBScript to infect many web pages [23], [45]. The objective of this
research is to study the nature of these attacks as well as to propose an efficient anomaly
host based system (IDS) to tackle the mentioned problem. This system is based on a
classification approach utilizing Principal Component Analysis (PCA), a Multivariate
Statistical Technique that identifies patterns in a large data set by highlighting their
similarities and differences. The reason of choosing PCA is that the data of the mentioned
problem is typically to be of high dimension, so PCA is applied to reduce the
dimensionality of the data without sacrificing its valuable information. PCA is used as a
feature extractor to extract patterns that will be used by the classifier, which follows the
feature extractor, to differentiate between normal and malicious script. Therefore, the
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introduced anomaly host based IDS could easily differentiate between normal and
malicious VBScripts, and could capture any VBScript with malicious behavior.

This work is based on two important hypotheses:
* The 1st hypothesis is based on the observation that the majority of malicious codes
exhibit different behaviors in comparison to normal codes, at the same time the codes
within each group share some common patterns.
* The 2nd hypothesis assumes that the code patterns exhibited in malicious VBScripts are
unique to attack codes and record very low presence in normal VBScripts.

The following are the steps taken to achieve the thesis objective.
1. The first step is studying the behavior of VBScript codes (Malicious and
Normal script). The concise nature of VBScript language, allowed studying the
normal patterns (features) of VBScript codes and detecting malicious script that
deviates from normal profile to prove the validity of the 1st assumption.
2. The second step is Pattern Identification (feature extraction): this step is
concerned with identifying and extracting patterns that characterize benign
codes from malicious scripts. In order to do so, PCA statistical analysis is used
to develop a feature extractor to extract measurements that are invariant or
insensitive to detect malicious script that deviates from Normal behaviors.
3. The third step is the Attack Classifier: An attack classifier (based on Euclidean
distance) is used to learn the best combination of feature elements in order to
categorize the incoming script into normal or malicious code.
4. The final step is Results analysis and validation: this step accomplishes the
thesis objective by analyzing the extracted results to show the validity of the
hypotheses proposed in the theoretical part. So, it measures the system’s
efficiency such as the detection rate of malicious script and the percentage of
false alarms by conducting two types of experiments for training and testing the
system. Experiment over unseen VBScripts (Cross Validation) [35], and
experiment over seen VBScripts.
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1.4 Thesis Organization
The thesis is divided into 6 chapters. Chapter 2 describes background and puts this
research into perspective. It discusses types of intrusion detection systems and
requirements for efficient IDS.
Chapter 3 discusses related work in the area of anomaly host based IDS that uses
multivariate statistical technique for extracting patterns for detection.
Chapter 4 describes the introduced Anomaly host based intrusion-detection system, and
its components, this IDS uses Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for extracting
features which are used to differentiate between Normal and Malicious VBScript.
Chapter 5 provides details of experiments and tests run on the system and the results of
these tests.
Chapter 6 provides conclusions and future work expectations.
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Chapter 2: Intrusion Detection

2.1 Introduction
As we increasingly rely on information infrastructures to support critical operations in
banking, transportation, and telecommunication, intrusions into information systems have
become a significant threat to our society with potentially severe consequences. An
intrusion compromises the security of an information system through various means
including denial of service, and information probing.

It is significant that the security mechanisms of any system are set up against intrusions
and unauthorized access through prevention, detection, and response [39]. So, building a
reliable computer system to detect intrusions resembles in many aspects a natural
immune system that protects the body from dangerous foreign attackers [13]. This field
of research is called Intrusion Detection; it complements prevention mechanism such as
firewalls, cryptography, and authentication to capture intrusions while they are acting on
the information system. This chapter will cover the concept of Intrusion Detection
System and its different types. Finally, it will highlight the use of Anomaly host based
IDS to prevent and detect malicious attacks.

2.2 What is an IDS
An earlier study conducted by Anderson [3] uses the term ‘threat’ in the same sense as
‘intrusion’ and defines it to be the potential possibility of a deliberate unauthorized
attempt to:
•

Access information.

•

Manipulate information, or.

•

Render a system unreliable or unusable.
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Another definition, introduced by Edward Amoroso [8], is that “Intrusion detection is the
process of identifying and responding to malicious activity targeted at computing and
networking resources”.
The definitions above are general enough to encompass all the threats mentioned earlier.

2.2.1 The Basic Concepts of Intrusion Detection
The concept of ‘Intrusion detection’ can be clarified through the introduction of three
basic, yet critical processes [8]:
Monitor: IDSs examine and process information about the target system activities. Many
technical and operational issues arise in this monitoring process including timeliness of
detection, confidence in information obtained, and processing power required to keep up
with the monitored activity.
Report: IDSs report information about monitored systems into a system security and
protection entity. This functional entity can be embedded in the monitoring component or
can be conducted separately.
Respond: The purpose of intrusion detection is to reduce security risk. When related
information is made available, an associated response function initiates mitigation
activities. Response actions introduces myriad of factors related to the timeliness and
appropriateness of the activities initiated by the IDS to deal with an incident.

16

2.2.2 A Generic Intrusion-Detection System
DATABASE

CONFIGURATION

ALARMS
DETECTOR

PROBES

COUNTERMEASURES

ACTIONS

AUDITS

SYSTEM

Figure 2. 1 : A simple Intrusion Detection System [9].

An IDS can be described at a very macroscopic level as a detector that processes
information coming into the system to be protected. As shown in Figure 2. 1, this detector
uses three kinds of information: long term information related to the technique used to
detect intrusions (a knowledge base of attacks), configuration information about the
current state of the system, and audit information describing the events that are happening
on the system [9].
The role of the detector is to eliminate unneeded information from the audit trail. It then
presents a synthetic view of the current security state of the system. A decision is then
taken to evaluate the probability that these states can be considered symptoms of
intrusions or vulnerabilities. A countermeasure component can take corrective action to
either prevent the threats from being executed or changing the state of the system back to
a secure state [8], [9].
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2.2.3 Characteristics of Intrusion Detection Systems
Figure 2. 2 introduces five concepts that classify IDSs [9]:
Behaviour Based

Detection
Method

Knowledge Based
Passive Alerting

Behaviour on
Detection

Active Alerting
Host Log Files
Network Packets

Intrusion Detection
System

Audit Source
Location

Application Log File
IDS Sensor Alert

Detection
Paradigm

State Based

Non-Perturbing Evaluation

Transition Based

Proactive Evaluation

Continuous Monitoring

Usage
Frequency

Periodic Analysis

Figure 2. 2 : Characteristics of Intrusion Detection Systems [9].

•

The detection method: describes the characteristics of the analyzer. When the IDS
uses information about the normal behavior of the system, it is qualified as
behavior based. Whereas when the IDS uses information about the attacks, it is
qualified as knowledge based.

•

The behavior on detection: describes the response of the IDS to attacks. When it
actively reacts to the attack by taking either corrective (closing holes), or proactive (logging out possible attackers, closing down services) actions, then the
IDS is said to be active. If the IDS merely generates alarms (including paging) it
is said to be passive.
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•

The audit source location: distinguishes IDSs based on the kind of input
information they analyze. This input information can be audit trails on a host,
network packets, application logs, or intrusion alerts generated by other IDSs.

•

The detection paradigm: describes the detection mechanism used by the IDS. IDS
can evaluate states or transitions. In addition, this evaluation can be performed in
a non-obtrusive way or by actively simulating the system to obtain a response.

•

The usage frequency: it has an orthogonal concept. Certain IDSs have real time
continuous monitoring capabilities, whereas others have to be run periodically.

2.2.4 Efficiency of intrusion detection systems
Some measures are considered to evaluate the efficiency of IDSs [9]:
•

Accuracy: deals with the proper detection of attacks and the absence of false
alarms. Inaccuracy occurs when an IDS flags as anomalous or an illegitimate
action in the environment.

•

Performance: is the rate at which audit events are processed. If the performance
of the IDS is poor, then real time detection is not possible

•

Completeness: is the property of an IDS to detect all attacks. Incompleteness
occurs when the IDS fails to detect an attack. This measure is much more difficult
to evaluate than the others because it is impossible to have a global knowledge
about attacks or abuses of privileges.

•

Fault tolerance: IDS should be resistant to attacks, especially denia l of service
attacks. This is particularly important because most IDS have run above
commercially available operating system or hardware, which are known to be
vulnerable to attacks.

•

Timeliness: An IDS has to perform and propagate its analysis as quickly as
possible in order to react before much damage has been done and also to prevent
the attacker from subverting the audit source or the IDS itself. This implies more
than the measure of performance because it, not only encompasses the processing
speed of the IDS, but also the time required to propagate the information and react
to it.
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2.3 Classification of IDS
There are different ways to classify an IDS; intrusion detection could be classified
according to their method of detection or according to the type of the protected system :

2.3.1 Classification based on the detection method [4], [9], [12]:
2.3.1.1 Misuse Detection10 or detection by appearance.
This method is also called “knowledge-based intrusion detection” [30] because it
applies

the

knowledge

accumulated

about

specific

attacks

and

system

vulnerabilities and use it to identify future intrusions. Similar to virus scanners,
Misuse detection algorithms make use of signature scanning, looking for unique
data fingerprints that identify certain types of attacks. It matches activities in an
information system with these signatures and signal intrusions when there is a
match. This approach requires previous knowledge of an attack and is rarely
effective on new attacks [34]. The accuracy of this method is considered good.
However, their completeness depends on the regular update of knowledge about
attacks.
•

Advantages: This approach has very low rate of false alarms making it easy to
understand the problem and take preventive or corrective measures.

•

Drawbacks: This method has the difficulty of gathering the required information
on known attacks and keeping an up to date list of all new vulnerabilities.
Moreover, maintenance of the knowledge base of the intrusion detection requires
careful analysis of vulnerability making it a time consuming task. Knowledge

10

Commercial IDS systems that are widely in use today are based on these signature algorithms, such as NSM/ASIM

NSM (Network Security Monitor) which is an intrusion detection system developed at the University of CaliforniaDavis, and IDES/NIDES the Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) developed at SRI [53], [54].

20

about attacks depends more on the operating system, version, platform, and
application. So, the resulting IDS is closely tied to a given environment.
2.3.1.2 Anomaly Detection or detection by behavior.
This approach assumes that intrusions can be detected by observing a deviation
from the normal behavior of the system or the users. The IDS compares the current
activities with a model of expected behavior. When a deviation is observed, an
alarm is generated. This means anything that does not correspond to a previously
learned behavior, is considered intrusive. Therefore, the IDS might be complete, but
judging its accuracy is a difficult issue [30].
To address this shortcoming, Anomaly intrusion detection look for any activity that
lies outside a certain prescribed range of "safe" activities, so it captures both known
and unknown intrusions if the activity under test demonstrates a significant
deviation from a norm profile.
•

Advantages: This approach can detect attempts to exploit new and unforeseen
vulnerabilities. They are less dependent on the operating system. They also help
to detect “abuse of privilege” types of attacks that do not actually involve
exploitation of any security vulnerability.

•

Drawbacks: The high false alarm rate is the main disadvantage of this approach
because the entire scope of the behavior of an information system may not be
covered during the learning phase. Moreover, the information system can
undergo attacks at the same time the IDS is learning the behavior. As a result, the
behavior profile will contain intrusive behavior, which is not detected as
anomalous.

2.3.2 Classification based on the type of the protected system [9], [12]:
Also depending on the method that can probe the system, IDS can also be classified as
host based or network based [9].
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2.3.2.1 Host based systems
It bases their decision on information obtained from a single host (usually audit
trails).
2.3.2.2 Network based systems
It obtains data by monitoring the traffic in the network to which the systems are
connected.

2.4 Different Approaches to anomaly host-based IDS
There is extensive research work in the literature on the security of network-based
anomaly IDS, such as the use of Bayesian models [28], and the use of data mining for
designing network anomaly IDSs [29] as well as the security of host-based Anomaly IDS
[25].

As the work in this thesis uses Anomaly host based IDS to detect malicious

VBScript attacks, so the following presents previous research in the area of Anomaly host
based IDS.

2.4.1 Analysis of sequences of system calls
One of the first developments in Anomaly host based intrusion detection was introduced
by Stephanie Forrest’s [13] which examines system processes for anomalous behavior
and extracts a reference table containing all known benign sequences of system calls.
These patterns are then used for live monitoring to check whether the sequences
generated are listed in the table or not. If they do not, an alarm is generated. The
application of this technique was shown viable for several Unix programs such as
“sendmail”, “lpr”, and “ftpd”.
A research group at the Columbia University [15] extended Forrest’s work [13] by
formulating machine learning tasks on operating system calls’ sequences of normal and
abnormal executions of the Unix sendmail program. The results show that system calls
can be used to detect intrusions even with different intrusion detection algorithms.
They conducted two sets of experiments.
a. First, sequences of several consecutive system calls were extracted from sendmail
traces and supplied to a machine-learning algorithm to learn the pattern of a
normal sequence.
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b. Second, a rule-learning program (RIPPER) was applied to the data to extract rules
for predicting whether a sequence of system calls is normal or abnormal.
However, the rules made by RIPPER can be erroneous. A post-processing
algorithm that filters spurious prediction errors is used to scan and to determine if
an intrusion has occurred.

Jones and Li [14] recently built on Forrest’s method using sequences of system calls, but
incorporated timing properties to create signatures that relate more closely and uniquely
to the application. The time measure used is the time duration between sequence calls.
Time distributions for each time interval between two calls in a unique sequence is
computed, then high variance data is excluded to create a database of normal signatures
that summarizes multiple measurements. The results show that by choosing appropriate
analysis methods and experimentally adjusting the parameters, intrusions are effectively
detected.
There are two main problems to system calls approach for host based IDS, which inhibits
their use in actual deployment:
•

The computational overhead for monitoring all system calls is very high which
degrades the system performance.

•

The system calls are irregular by nature, which makes it difficult to differentiate
between normal and malicious behaviors, and increases the false positive rate.

2.4.2 Detection through the use of Neural Networks
Neural Networks (NNs) 11 have been identified as a very promising technique for
addressing the high false positive rate characterizing intrusion detection systems [24].
The basic origin of this problem stems from the dynamic nature of systems and networks.

11

Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are programs designed to simulate the way a simple biological nervous

system is believed to operate. They are based on simulated nerve cells or neurons joined together in a variety of
ways to form networks. These networks have the capacity to learn, memorize and create relationships amongst
data [26].
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It is very easy for a legitimate traffic to be mistaken for an intrusion attempt, which may
yield self- inflicted denial of service incidents.
Multi layer perceptron network (MLP) [16] was proposed to examine applications at the
process level in an attempt to detect anomalous beha vior. The basic concept of this
approach is the assumption that regardless of user characteristics and anomalous behavior
at the application level, activities that are distinguishable and identifiable as anomalous
will be generated at the process level as well. Results of MLP based intrusion detection
systems demonstrate the suitability of using neural networks in layered detection
architectures to verify alerts and minimize false positives [36].
One of the pioneer researches into the use of recurrent networks in anomaly IDS was the
use of Elman networks [17], [36] in the analysis of program behavior. They are similar to
the MLP with additional context nodes, which maintain a state of the system. The Elman
network works by predicting the next sequence given a present input and the context. The
actual next sequence is compared to the predicted sequence and the difference between
them represents the measure of anomaly.
The advantages of using Neural Networks are:
•

They cope well with noisy data, hence a potential reduction to false negative rate.

•

Their success does not depend on any statistical assumption about the nature of
the underlying data, and they are easier to modify for new user communities.

However, they have some problems.
•

First, a small threshold will result in false positives while a large threshold will
result in irrelevant data as well as increase the chance of false negatives.

•

Second, the net topology is only determined after considerable trial and error. And
third, the intruder can train the net during its learning phase

The vast majority of NNs researches into IDS have been limited to the application of
the multi layer perceptron network (MLP). Only recently has the unsupervised
learning model of the self-organizing map (SOM) [36], [68] been investigated but
only to user behavior analysis. Therefore, future anomaly IDS researches using NN
should be focused on two distinct fronts:
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•

The investigation of other NNs topologies, especially recurrent networks.

•

Specialization of the functions of the NN detection engine.

•

And the extension of NNs monitoring domains to include more system level

inputs (program behavior) in addition to the present focus on user behavior analysis.

2.4.3 Detection through the use of Data Mining
There has also been a growing interest in the use of data mining techniques in Anomaly
IDS to detect previously unseen malicious programs. Data mining 12 methods detect
patterns such as code signatures in large amount of data and use these patterns to detect
future instances in similar data [32].
A research introduced by Schultz et. al [33] aims to explore a number of standard data
mining techniques over a set of training data to generate a rule based classifier to detect
new malicious executables. The data mining results were compared to a traditional
signature based algorithm and showed that the data mining method more than doubles the
current detection rates for new malicious executables.

Another work presented in [32] uses a Malicious Email Filter (MEF) incorporated into
procmail that filters multiple attachments in e- mails by using detection models obtained
from the use of data mining over known malicious attachments.
The MEF system has three capabilities:
•

It detects known and unknown malicious attachments.

•

It provides a method for monitoring and measuring the spread of malicious
attachments.

•

It also allows for the efficient propagation of detection models from a central
server.

12

Data mining is a process that uses a variety of data analysis tools to discover patterns and look at numerous

multidimensional data relationships concurrently, highlighting those that are dominant or exceptional [29].
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One major problem in applications of data mining to intrusion detection is that detection
models are produced off- line because the learning algorithms are applied to tremendous
amounts of archived audit data. These models can naturally be used for off-line intrusion
detection, or analyzing audit data off- line after intrusions have run their course. However,
effective intrusion detection should happen in real-time, as intrusions take place, to
minimize security compromises.

Moreover, a data mining based IDS is significantly more complex than a traditional
system. The main cause for this is that data mining methods impose a heavy load on the
resources of the system under protection. The use of physical memory and processing
power significantly increases as the size of the database used increases, thus yielding a
serious trade-off between accuracy of detection and performance of the system and its
applications. Therefore, the space complexity of data mining algorithms needs to be
improved without sacrificing accuracy.

2.5 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the role of Intrusion detection as an important component of the
security controls and mechanisms provided in a system. IDS usually forms the last line of
defense against security threats, so it detects breaches that cannot be easily detected using
other methods.
It was shown that existing Intrusion detection techniques fall in two major categories:
Anomaly detection, and Misuse detection. Misuse detection is known as a signature based
system which has a limitation in that they cannot detect novel attacks. This limitation is
overcome by using Anomaly detection techniques as a complement. So, Anomaly
detection can detect both known and unknown attacks if they demonstrate departure from
a norm profile. Two types of IDS are in use for both anomaly and misuse detection, such
as host based, and network based. Host based systems perform host- level monitoring
while Network based systems monitor the traffic in the network to which the systems are
connected.
As the work in this thesis uses anomaly host based IDS for detecting malicious VBScript
codes that deviate from the normal behavior. Thus, this chapter focuses on anomaly host
based IDS as an intrusion detection technique; moreover, the next chapter will give a
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survey of statistical techniques based on anomaly host based IDS that are used by other
systems for detecting intrusions. It also outlines related work in the literature that studies
the identification of attacks through the analysis of the source code.
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Chapter 3: Related Work

3.1 Introduction
Today with the increasing complexity in business needs, most web hosts design their web
pages to deliver dynamic contents and rich features to Internet clients using some of the
many available Internet scripting languages. Web script codes, such as VBScript or
JavaScript [10], [44], [45] are programming languages embedded in web pages to provide
robust functionality to Internet applications. The increased dependence on these web
scripts was met with an increased threat on the underlying systems security.
Researchers have found a number of security holes and vulnerabilities that are capable of
exploiting web systems. Web script attacks, such as the propagation of malicious scripts
through e-mail attachments especially new and unseen ones have rapidly increased and
continue to be a leading security threat on the Internet. Recently, there have been some
high profile incidents, such as “I LOVE YOU” [40], [67], Netsky [66] and its clones
transmitted with malicious e- mail attachments that caused significant damage in a short
time frame.
Web Script codes are transmitted as source codes over the Internet and executed on any
target machine, accordingly they are hardware independent, while programs stored in
binary form have limited potential to be used over the Internet due to their hardware
dependence. Moreover, these script codes run mostly on the windows platform ( i.e. the
world’s most dominant operating system) to access applications and system resources.
Thus, they can independently migrate from host to host causing serious damages to
various applications. For these reasons, the behavior and structure of source code attacks
is receiving an increasing focus in the literature.
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Based on the above, it is obvious that studying the security of web scripts such as
VBScript is an important research area. The research presented in this thesis thus focuses
on studying the behavior of VBScript attacks and proposes an Anomaly host-based IDS
system in order to prevent potential VBScript attacks.
This chapter will review prior work in two related areas in security research that directly
correlates to the proposed work in the thesis:
1- The analysis of source codes for attacks detection.
2- The use of statistical techniques (for analysis) on source code to develop an
anomaly host-based IDS.

3.2 Detecting attacks through source code analysis
Source code analysis has become so significant as it is used in the assessment of code
quality to find subtle defects in the code that the compiler might miss. Moreover, it is
used in the analysis of Web script codes that are transmitted as source codes over the
Internet and executed on the fly on different hardware platforms causing serious damages
to various applications. Among the many software al nguages that are used for script
coding (VBScript and Javascript) [23], [44] dominate the vast majority of Internet script
utilization, and while they received very little attention in the literature till recently [45].
Detecting attacks of programs written in C language received significant focus [19]. The
following section will highlight the main developments in the area of detecting attack
source codes written in C language.
There have been a series of studies [50] that looked at modeling normal or malicious
profiles by considering different properties of activity data such as:
•

The frequency property (number of consecutive occurrence of individual events).

•

The duration property (time of an event).

•

and the ordering property (sequence or transition of events).

in order to detect intrusions. The results of these studies showed that the duration
property is not sufficient to detect intrusions. Moreover, the ordering property of multiple
audit events, which provides additional advantages to the frequency property for
detecting intrusions are not effective unless the scalability problem of complex data is too
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small. Thus, intrusion detection techniques based on the frequency property provides
viable solution that produces good intrusion detection with low computational overhead.
And as a result, the work presented in this thesis was chosen to focus on the frequency
property in all the statistical techniques.

3.2.1 Attacks exploiting buffer-overflow systems vulnerability
Few researches have been developed to detect vulnerabilities in C language. Wagner et
al. [56] have developed a system to detect buffer overflows by using static analysis in
programs written in C language. Their approach treats C strings as an abstract data type
accessed through the library routines and models buffers as pairs of integer ranges (size
and current length), while the detection problem is formulated as an integer constraint
problem. The library functions are modeled in terms of how they modify the size and
length of strings. This method was concluded to be imprecise because it gives both false
positives and false negatives.
One of the recent developments as well in that area was introduced by Larochelle [55]
who presented a lightweight annotation assisted static analysis based on LCLint. This
technique exploits information provided in programmer’s semantic comments to detect
buffer overflow vulnerabilities. The annotations are treated as regular C comments by the
compiler, but recognized as syntactic entities by LCLint. The work was concluded to be
useful in detecting that kind of attacks. A significant drawback though, is the focus on
only one kind of attacks. The technique has several limitations if applied over a wider
range of known attacks, such as the number of false warnings is quite high, and more
annotations are needed to be inserted in the code to facilitate the checking of constraints.
Moreover detection rate were not studied for testing over unknown attacks [55].

3.2.2 Attacks increasing system privileges
Cunningham and Stevenson [19] introduced a novel approach that accurately verifies
script codes of UNIX attacks developed in C (or UNIX shell scripts). By detecting and
differentiating those attacks that increase privileges from normal source codes. Although
intrusion detection research is focused on detecting attacks after they occur, the technique
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used by Cunningham and Stevenson resembles virus detection as they detect attacks
before the script is run. This work has much in common with the virus detection
literature. The most common technique used is signature verification, in which scripts’
signatures are scanned and compared with a list of those which are known to be
representative of attacks.

System Architecture

Data Streams

C attack detector
Detection

Language Identifier
e.g. C, Unix Shell
Script

Report
Attack

Feature
Extraction

Yes

Shell attack
detector

Attack
Classifier

No

Save to
Disk

Figure 3. 1 : The System Architecture of Detecting Source Code of Attacks [19].

The above Figure 3. 1 depicts Cunningham and Stevenson’s proposed system
architecture. The system intercepts incoming data streams and processes them to
determine whether it is an attack or benign stream before reporting to the operating
system. It is composed of two main functions:
1. Language identification
2. Attack detection
The language identifier is responsible for determining the language type of the incoming
stream. It bases the decision on finding keywords used for the specific script language
(e.g. for C, it looks for keywords such as printf or scanf). The benefit of that structure is
that it allows for expanding on the system by adding identification for many languages
(not just C) as proposed by the authors.
In the heart of the system lays an attack detection module which is language specific. For
example, the C language detection module is triggered if the output of the language
classifier shows the incoming stream to be C script. The detection module first extracts
31

features from the incoming script to use it for determining whether there is a potential
attack or not. Cunningham and Stevenson showed that by extracting the adequate features
from the script, the extracted features can be used to differentiate between malicious and
benign scripts.

The feature extractor is essentially a language-specific parser that gathers statistics about
the script and stores it in sets of triples (regular expression, code category, encoding
scheme). Each time the regular expression records a match, the feature statistic is updated
to reflect higher utilization of that specific feature.
A vector of feature statistics is then fed into a neural- network based classifier that is used
to learn the best combination of feature elements in order to categorize the source into
normal or malicious code. Therefore, if an attack is detected the IDS is notified, and the
user can interpret the attacker’s actions for the intended target.
The work in the thesis represents an extension on Cunningham’s work. A system of
similar architecture is used to detect attacks by monitoring VBScript source code. It uses
a feature extractor for extracting features from VBScript codes and an attack classifier to
determine a malicious from normal VBScript code by using statistical analysis technique
such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [57].

3.3 Statistical-based anomaly detection techniques
Cunningham and Stevenson [19] proposed a neural-network based system in order to
classify the nature of the attack. In general, once the features are extracted from the
incoming data stream, there are many techniques that can be used to classify and
determine whether the code is normal or malicious.
In addition to the use of neural networks, several statistical based detection techniques
were studied in the literature. Such techniques use statistical properties (e.g., mean and
variance) of normal activities to build a norm profile and employ statistical tests in order
to determine whether the observed activities deviate significantly from the norm profile
[49].
Statistical-based anomaly detection techniques are inherently capable of handling
variations and noises involved in activities of information system. A norm profile
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represents the features of normal activities’ scripts. It should be able though to distinguish
between expected variations in benign code from truly anomalous behavior.

3.3.1 Statistical process control
There are two main techniques in statistical process that are designed to handle different
scenarios, but usually work together in the process control [48], [49]:
•

Univariate statistical process control
It explores each variable in a data set, separately. It looks at the range of values, as
well as the central tendency of these values, so it describes the pattern of response
to the variable.
An observation is signaled if it does not conform to the normal profile, which is
created using historical data. This signal may be due to a shift in the process mean
and/or a shift in the process variation. Since only one variable is considered at a
time, its relationship with other variables is ignored, and consequently some
important information is lost.
Earlier studies on statistical-based anomaly detection techniques are based on a
statistical technique developed for (Intrusion Detection Expert System/Next
Generation Intrusion Detection Expert System) IDES/NIDES [53], [54]. This is a
Univariate technique that computes test statistics of a normal distribution using
data on a single measure. This technique has several drawbacks [48], [49]:
-

First of all, the technique is sensitive to the normality assumption. If data
on a measure are not normally distributed, the technique yields a high false
alarm rate.

-

Second, it is based on a Univariate technique where a norm profile is built
for only one measure of activities in information systems. On the other
hand, intrusions often affect multiple measures of activities collectively.
Anomalies resulting from intrusions may cause deviations on multiple
measures

in

a

collective

manner

rather

than

through

separate

manifestations on individual measures. Thus, Multivariate technique is a
more promising area for research.
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•

Multivariate statistical process control
It deals with all the variables simultaneously. Multivariate quality control methods
not only can extract information on individual characteristics, but also can
identify and monitor the correlation structure among them.
A signal is generated to an event when any of the process variables falls outside
the bound of process variation established by the historical data. An event is also
signaled when relationships among the variables change [49].

A multivariate statistical quality monitoring is composed of two phases [48], [49]:
Phase I: Estimate process parameters.
Stage 1: Retrospective examination of subgroup behavior: it is the stage
where historical observations are analyzed, normal behaviors are extracted
and the control parameters of the process are estimated. So, a norm profile
is set up with the control parameters
Stage 2: Prospective examination of future subgroups: it is the stage where
control charts are used to detect abnormal events using the norm profile. If
any anomalous phenomenon is detected during this stage, the parameters,
estimated in the 1st phase, are rechecked and re-estimated to build a new
norm profile. After several iterative procedures, the most suitable profile is
found and used in the 2nd phase to control the process in real environment
Phase II: Use the results of the 1st phase as process parameters.
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Difference between Univariate and Multivariate Technique:

A miss by
univariate tests

separate

Control limits from separate Univariate tests
Control limits from a correlated Multivariate test like the X2 test

Figure 3. 2 : Differences between the control limits of separate Univariate tests and the control
limit of a Multivariate test [46].

Univariate control does not take into account that variables are dependent from each other
and their correlation information can be very important for understanding process
behavior. Thus, this method fails in detection because abnormality information is
concealed inside the relationship among the variables. Moreover, it cannot detect
abnormal behavior efficiently in noisy environment as well. In contrast, the multivariate
control method has several benefits. It takes advantage of the correlation information and
analyzes the data jointly. So, it provides an overall picture about the process change [46].
It is well understood as depicted in the above Figure 3. 2 that separate Univariate tests on
individual variables can lead to misses caused by incorrect control limits of significant
probabilities.
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3.3.2 Multivariate statistical techniques in intrusion detection
Multivariate process control techniques that are used in Intrusion Detection systems
include [46], [51]:
a. Hotelling’s T2
b. chi-squared statistics
c. and Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
All these techniques are applied to intrusion detection for monitoring and detecting
anomalies of a process in an information system.

a. Hotelling's T2 Test
Hotelling’s T2 [47] is a measure of the statistical distance from an observation to the
mean estimate of the multivariate normal distribution. It is a widely used statistic for
creating a multivariate control with individual observations. It combines information
from all the variables in the process; so it provides an overall picture about the change of
process. This technique is applied to intrusion detection for monitoring and detecting
anomalies of a process in an information system.
Let us consider the computational procedure of Hotelling’s T 2 :
Xi = (Xi1 ,Xi2 , . . .,Xip ) denote an observation of P measures on a process or system at time
i. When the process is operating normally (in control), the population of X follows a
multivariate normal distribution with the mean vector µ and the covariance matrix S.
Using a data sample of size n, the sample mean vector x in equation (1) and the sample
covariance matrix S in equation (2) are usually used to estimate µ and S.

x = ( x 1, x 2,…, x p).

S=

(1)

1 n
∑ (xi − x )( xi − x )′.
n − 1 i =1

(2)

T 2 = ( xi − x) s −1 ( xi − x ).

(3)
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A large value of T2 in equation (3) indicates a large deviation of the observation Xi from
the in control population. So it signals that a statistically significant shift in the mean has
occurred as soon as it is larger than a threshold limit.

Related Work
Nong ye [46] introduces the use of Hotelling’s T2 distribution to detect intrusive events
by getting a norm profile when training the system with normal events. Based on this
normal profile, abnormal activities can be detected in a testing event set.
Hotelling’s T2 technique detects both counter-relationship and mean shift anomalies by
focusing on the individual sample mean and the sample covariance matrix, which are the
main control parameters of the norm profile.
The performance of the Hotelling’s T2 test is examined on two sets of computer audit
data: a small data set and a large multiday data set.
For the small data set, the Hotelling’s T2 test signals all the intrusion session and
produces no false alarms for the normal session.
For the large data set, the Hotelling’s T2 test signals 92 percent of the intrusion sessions
while producing no false alarms for the normal session.

b. The Chi square test
Chi Square test X2 [47], [48] is another multivariate statistical analysis technique based
on the chi square distribution. It is used for the ‘goodness-of-fit’ test because it checks
whether there is a close fit between the data (O = Observed frequency) and the theory (E
= Expected frequency). X2 determines whether the differences between the observed and
expected scores can be attributed to some actual difference in behavior or if this
difference between the scores is a deviation from the norm profile caused by an attack.
The following illustrates the X2 test:
Consider there are P variables to measure and Xj denotes the observation of the jth
variable at a particular time the X2 test statistic is given by the equation (4).

x2 =

p

( xj − xj) 2

j =1

xj

∑

(4)
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X2 is the sum of squared differences between the observed and expected values of those
variables. When the P variables are independent and P is large, the X2 statistic follows
approximately a normal distribution.
The X2 distance test measures the distance of a data point from the center of a data
population. Thus, it is similar to Euclidean distance [52] but uses the average value on
each variable to scale the Euclidean distance on that variable or dimension.
Unlike the Hotelling’s T2 statistic which is a distance measure taking into account the
covariance of multiple variables, the X2 does not consider the relationships of multiple
variables in order to simplify the computation.

Related Work
A technique based on X2 statistic was presented by [47] that builds a norm profile of an
information system and detects a large departure from the norm profile as a likely
intrusion.
The results of that study show that the multivariate statistical technique based on the chisquare test statistic achieves low false alarm rate with high detection rate.
Although in this study the X2 was tested using a small set of testing data, the results of
this study demonstrate the promising potential of this technique for intrusion detection. It
was concluded that this technique will be tested in the future with a large set of testing
data for further evaluating of the performance and scalability.

c. Principal Components Analysis
Principal components analysis (PCA) [51], [57], [58] is used to explain the variancecovariance structure through few linear combinations of the original variables. PCA is
also known as a projection method and its key objective is data reduction in a rich data
environment for easy exploration and further analysis.
Work in the areas of digital signal and image processing [57], [58] found that, depending
on the nature of data, it can be adequately explained using just a few factors, often far
fewer than the number of original variables. Moreover, there is almost as much
information in the few principal components as there is in all of the original variables
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Principal components are particular linear combinations of original variable set with three
important properties [47]:
1- The principal components are uncorrelated.
2- The first principal component has the highest variance; the second principal has
the second highest variance and so on.
3- The total variation in all the principal components combined equal to the total
variation in the original variables.
The new variables with such properties are obtained from the eigenvalues’ analysis of
the covariance matrix of the original variables [48].
Thus, the data overload often experienced in a rich data environment can be solved using
PCA by observing the first few principal components with no significant loss of
information. It is often found that PCA provides combinations of variables that are useful
indicators of particular events or stages in the process.

Related Work
Cai [59] proposes the use of Principal component analysis in the detection of intrusions
from malicious executables often spread as e-mail attachments. This technique
outperforms many other techniques by detecting malicious executables identified as
outliers that significantly deviate from the normal profile.
Shyu [51] proposes a novel scheme that uses robust principal component classifier in
intrusion detection problem where the training data may be unsupervised. As anomalies
can be treated as outliers, an intrusion predictive model is constructed from the major and
minor principal components of no rmal instances. Anomalies are qualitatively different
from the normal instances. That is a large deviation from the established normal patterns
can be flagged as attacks. So, a measure of the difference of an anomaly from the normal
instance is the distance in the principal component space.
This approach was tested on the KDD Cup 1999 [51]and it demonstrates that this method
achieves high detection rate with low false alarm rate and outperforms other earlier
techniques. Moreover, the statistics can be computed in less amount of time during the
detection stage which makes it possible to use the method in real time.
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Advantage of Principal component analysis to intrusion detection
The principal component approach to intrusion detection has some advantages [51].
First, it does not have any distributional assumption. Many statistical based intrusion
detection methods assume a normal distribution which is a very general assumption and
is not supported by any observation.
Second, it is typical for the data of this type of problems to be of high dimensionality.
Hence, principal component analysis (PCA) is applied to reduce the dimensionality of the
original data without sacrificing valuable information. Only a fe w parameters of principal
components need to be retained for future detection as well.

3.3.3 Comparison between the different Statistical techniques
Nong ye [46] compared the results of two multivariate statistical techniques such as
Hotelling’s T2 , and the Chi-square X2 test in order to analyze and detect intrusions into
the host that leave trails in the audit data. As stated above, both Hotelling’s T2 test
statistic and the Chi-square X2 test measure the distance of an observation from the
multivariate mean vector of a population. The Hotelling’s T2 test statistic uses the
statistical distance that incorporates both mean shifts and counter-relationships (the
relationships of multiple variables) whereas the Chi-square X2 test detects only mean
shifts.
The results of this study show that the performance of Hotelling’s T2 test for intrusion
detection is not compensated by its intensive computation in comparison to the
performance of the Chi-square X2 test that detects only mean shifts. The Chi-square X2
performed well in intrusion detection, it signaled all the intrusion session and produced
no false alarms on the normal sessions. Therefore, it appears that a Chi-square X2
multivariate analysis technique detecting mean shifts is only sufficient and effective for
intrusion detection than The Hotelling’s T2 test. This is due to the nature of intrusion
detection problem which distinguishes between normal events from intrusive events by
capturing any departure from the normal profile i.e. any deviation of an observation from
the mean as an anomaly or likely intrusion. Thus, intrusion is manifested more through
focusing on detecting mean shifts rather than the relationships of multiple variables.
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Moreover, the computational complexity of the Chi-square X2 test is much less than the
Hotelling’s T2 test.

3.4 Conclusion
This chapter focused on two important areas related to the work presented in the thesis.
First, it reviews previous work in the area of detecting attacks through source codes
analysis. Second, it describes statistical based anomaly detection technique such as
Univariate and Multivariate statistical technique.
It points how Multivariate technique provides an overall picture about the process change
than Univariate technique which does not take into account that variables are dependent
of each other. Thus, it fails in detection because abnormality information is concealed
inside the relationship among the variables.
Multivariate statistical techniques can be classified into distance-based techniques, and
variance-covariance relation based techniques.
Distance-based techniques use the distance between the mean normal profile and the
current observation value in order to detect intrusions. There are many distance metrics
that fall under this category such as the Euclidean distance, Chi-square, and Canberra
metric [52].
Variance-covariance relation based techniques use a measure that takes into account the
covariance of multiple variables (the relationship of multi- variables). Hotelling’s T2 and
Principal Component Analysis fall under this category. However, Principal Component
Analysis provides a greater advantage in comparison to Hotelling’s T2 because it reduces
the data dimensionality without sacrificing information content. So, instead of dealing
with hundreds of variables, a few principal components are used.
Based on the above, the work on the thesis will focus on using Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) as a statistical technique to reduce data dimensionality of the variables
(features) in VBScript codes.
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Chapter 4: Development of an Anomaly Host Based IDS

4.1 Introduction
Rapid development in Internet technology provided people with a convenient way to
exchange large amounts of information. However, the Internet is basically an insecure
environment mainly because its native design lacks the presence of security barriers to
prevent malicious attacks. For that reason, the need for Internet security systems grew as
fast as the dependence on the Internet to conduct business transactions.
Another area that received significant attention as well was the detection of attacks
through the analysis of the source code of the incoming data streams. This technique is
most useful in identifying attacks embedded in Shell and C source codes (in UNIX
environment).
The use of script languages, especially VBScripts [23], [44] on web pages is now a
common practice. VBScript attacks continue to be a leading security threat on the
Internet. A VBScript virus, such as “Loveletter” [40] caused global havoc by embedding
its code in HTML email to hide its malicious potential. Moreover, VBScript is a very
easy script language to program. Accordingly, writing a VBScript virus nowadays is
becoming an extremely easy task in comparison to the old use of assemblers requiring
specialized and highly skilled programmers.
As a result of the above discussion, the work presented in this thesis addresses an area
that received little attention despite its growing importance. This chapter will present an
anomaly host based IDS that efficiently identifies VBScript attacks. As stated earlier in
chapter 3, this IDS model represents an extension on a similar research line followed by
Cunningham [19], which detects script codes of UNIX attacks developed in C or shell
script code that increase privileges. The introduced technique uses a classifier based on a
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Multivariate statistical technique, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [57], to identify
patterns of benign behavior and to express the data in such a way to highlight their
similarities and differences. So, the IDS could easily differentiate between normal and
malicious VBScripts, and could capture any future malicious scripts that exhibit different
or abnormal patterns from a profile of normal behavior.
The analysis followed to develop the IDS was divided into the following phases:
1. Malicious code study: this phase studies the behavior of malicious VBScript
codes and how malicious patterns deviate from normal behavior. The outcome of
this study was useful in identifying the key differences between patterns of benign
and malicious scripts.
2. Pattern Identification (feature extractor): in that stage, the concern was to identify
patterns that characterize benign codes. Hence, a large data set was collected to
extract features that identify the common themes across the code. This problem is
tackled by using an efficient multivariate statistical technique such as PCA
statistical analysis as a feature extractor.
3. Attack Classifier: an implementation for an attack classifier was proposed. This
classifier is used to learn the best combination of feature elements in order to
categorize the incoming script into normal or malicious code.
4. Results analysis and validation: this phase analyzes the results to show the
validity of the hypotheses proposed.

4.2 Malicious code study
Script mobile codes are usually written in scrip ting language, such as VBScript or Java
script. VBScript language was developed by Microsoft as a competitor to Java script for
automating web pages; the most obvious difference between them is only in their syntax
[10]. My preference to study and focus on VBScript is due to the fact that VBScript is
receiving increasing focus as a serious threat for attacking many computers [10], [44]. To
illustrate the size of the problem associated with the lack of security in mobile VBScript
codes, it is remarkable to realize that in 1999; only 2 malicious VBScript were publicly
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known [10]. Nowadays there are more than 4000 registered malicious VBScript and the
toll increases everyday [20], [21].
This fact implies that VBScript codes are receiving increasing focus as a backdoor for
attacking computers by threatening the user’s computer through sending itself through email attachment or through browsing an infected site. The core of the malicious script,
which contains the destructive part of the virus, can restrict its activity to unnoticeable
level by changing the windows registry, causing data’s loss, and spreading itself to infect
other systems.

4.2.1 Data Collection
In order to study the behavior of malicious attacks, it was necessary to collect information
around the nature of these attacks, the different methods of infections, and propagations.
This necessitated getting hand on the source code of VBScript attacks in order to
understand the specific behaviors exhibited by attack codes.
The following represents various sources used in the process of gathering information
around VBScript attacks,
1. Antivirus sites (e.g. McAfee, Symantec) [20], [21].
Antivirus sites contain a wealth of information around the different viral attacks.
They provide a comprehensive analysis on the behavior of the different attacks
and its execution flow.
2. Private security sites (e.g. Ebcvg.com Your source for information security)[60].
This was the main source used in gathering attack source codes. Over the internet,
there are some sites specialized in serving information security. Many of these
sites focus on building an up-to-date list of source codes of current attacks and
they offer these sources for sale.
3. Virus collectors’ sites (e.g. VX Heavens)[61].
Amateur sites were used to top up the gathered virus collection through
exchanging Virii source codes with other collectors.
Due to security measures over the Internet, getting a large sample of malicious VBScripts
represents a difficult task because many hackers’ sites or virus collectors’ are rapidly
closed. Moreover, displaying security vulnerabilities or holes on the Web could be used
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as a conduit by other malicious hackers or rogue programs to steal data or wreak other
damages. So, the total number of collected malicious VBScripts from private sites and
virus collectors to represent the malicious VBScript code population in this work are in
the range of 283 malicious VBScripts (see Appendix D).
The group of malicious VBScripts under study covers many of the known attack
techniques,
1. Scripts that infect Vbs files and reside in the directories c:\, c:\windows,
c:\windows\desktop, c:\my documents, and c:\startup.
2. Sometimes these malignant scripts insert infected Vbs/doc/htm, or Vba macro
virus.
3. or propagate via MS-Outlook.
On the other hand, in order to study the normal behavior of VBScript codes,
approximately 1113 general-purpose VBScripts (see Appendix D) were collected
representing around 3 times the attack code collection. This collection was gathered to
cover a wide range of applications such as [44],
1. Maintaining Disk and file systems, files and folders, logs, printing, processes,
registry, and services.
2. Providing security such as verifying script signature.
3. Task scheduling.
4. Creating users accounts and groups
5. And other multi purpose script collected from Microsoft technet script center.

4.2.2 Attack pattern analysis
The foundation of all attack detection techniques to date is based on the ability to
differentiate between normal and malicious behaviors. This implicitly suggests that all
malicious codes exhibit different behaviors in comparison to benign codes, at the same
time codes within each group share common patterns (initially referred to as the 1st
hypothesis stated earlier in Chapter1).
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The first part of the above assumption was verified by analyzing the collected Malicious
VBScript codes, as it was apparent that malicious script codes can take distinctive forms
that differentiate them from normal codes.

a. Types of attack codes
According to the method of attack, malicious VBScript codes can be classified into 3
main categories: namely viruses, worms, and Trojan horses [20], [21], [23].
1. A Virus is a program that causes an unexpected event by infecting and modifying
other programs. It is also capable of self-execution and replication.
2. A Worm is a program that resides in the active memory of a computer and
duplicates itself. It may send copies to other computers through some
communication applications (e.g. Internet Relay Chat - IRC).
3. A Trojan Horse is a malicious program that pretends to be a benign application,
but does unexpected destruction to different programs. Trojans are unlike viruses
since they do not replicate.
It is noted from the above classification that these categories of malicious codes are not
mutually exclusive. For instance, a malicious program could be both a worm and a virus
or a worm could be delivered as a Trojan. Hence, these forms of attacks cover all known
malicious VBScripts.

b. Life cycle of attack code
In order to verify the 2nd part of the assumption (i.e., ‘attack codes share common
patterns’), it is necessary to understand more about the life cycle of attack codes. The
CERIAS Intrusion Detection Research Group [62] analyzed the behavior of several
worms, and developed a general life-cycle that describes the different stages that an
attack code passes through. The life cycle from the point of view of the victim host
consists of four stages as shown in Figure 4. 1:
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1. Target Selection

Victim
Host

2. Exploit

Network
3. Infect

4. Propagation

Figure 4. 1 : The Life Cycle of Attack Codes.

1. Target selection
The target selection stage is the phase when an uninfected host is chosen
for attack. This is where the malicious code or worm performs
reconnaissance to determine other potential victims.

2. Exploitation
The exploitation phase is when the attacker compromises the target by
exploiting a particular vulnerability (or convincing the victim to execute
the code). Worms use well known vulnerabilities and published exploits to
compromise their target.

3. Infection
The infection stage is significant in this life-cycle, as the malicious code
copies itself on to the victim machine and then performs any number of
different actions. The line between the infection and exploitation stage is
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sometimes blurred. For example, the Code Red worm13 [62]actually loads
itself into the victim’s memory as part of the exploit used to compromise
the victim. The infection stage is understood to be the time when the worm
“sets up shop” on the newly infected machine. For example, the worm can
open backdoors, change system files, or attempt to hide its presence by
replacing system utilities with Trojan horses.

4. Propagation
In the propagation stage, the malicious code attempts to spread by
choosing new targets. The difference between this stage and the target
selection is simply from the point of view of the machine which the
actions take place from. In target selection, a remotely infected host
chooses the local host as a target. In the propagation stage, the infected
local host is the one choosing a new target, using probes going out in
outbound network traffic.
According to the aforementioned categorization, it is clear that the typical malicious
script codes can exhibit many similar activities [20], [21]. By grouping their common
actions, it can be concluded that malicious VBScript can perform one or more of the
following basic functions:
•

Registration, allows the malicious code, to register itself on infected machines for
future reference. Discovering the attack code during this stage is quite difficult, as
the malicious code would restrict its activity to an unnoticeable level.

•

Infection, is the core of the malicious code, and contains the destructive part of
the virus. Typically, this includes effects such as loss of data or sluggish system
response.

•

Replication is the method where a malicious code can survive by infecting new
systems.

13

It is a computer Worm, discovered in July 2001. It only infects windows machines running Microsoft IIS

web servers. It exploits a bufferoverrun vulnerability which was by no means new when the worm started to
spread.
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According to the above discussion, malicious VBScript can be detected by extracting
abnormal ‘features’ from malicious codes that deviate from normal behavior.

c. ‘Features’ of attack codes
In order to be able to group the different behavioral patterns of normal or attack codes, it
is necessary to introduce a definition of the features that can be used to identify such
patterns.
A feature can be defined as a particular regular expression or element that is scanned
over a particular code. Each time the regular expression matches, the feature type
statistics is set by applying different encoding schemes.
Accordingly, a feature type can be thought of as a set of:
a. Regular expression or element: which is a fragment or constituent of a larger unit
(script code), it is composed of VBScript lexically related keywords, function, or
methods that are combined together to form a specific pattern or feature.
b. Encoding schemes: are the statistics used to record a match found of a regular
expression within the code. There are several encoding schemes used in the
current problem such as:
Repetition (count): it indicates the total number of times an element appears in
normal or malicious codes
Occurrence: it indicates the existence of an element within the code.

In order to illustrate this concept, the following example shows a typical malicious
feature that uses MS Outlook to mass- mail other hosts. The worm uses distinct keywords
to propagate via MS Outlook (its basic function is replication as stated above)[21]:
1. First step, it creates an object to enable using MS Outlook. In VBS this is done by
calling the ‘CreateObject’ method and putting ‘Outlook.Application’ as a
parameter. Hence the lexical word used to identify that segment of the feature is
•

"Createobject(Outlook.Application)
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2. After creating an object equivalent to MS Outlook application, it is necessary to
gain access to the mail system in order to be able to send emails. This is carried
by getting the namespace for the Mail Application Programming Interface
(MAPI).
•

That step is typically carried using the following command

"Getnamespace(“MAPI”)

3. After opening MS Outlook and getting access to the mail system, the next step is
to get the address list from the current user on the victim machine. This step
usually involves recalls to the following properties
•

"Addresslists"

•

"Addressentries.count"

4. The final step in the replication feature is to create a mail message and send it to
the identified address list. The mail has a subject line, body, and attached
document, hence that segment of the replication feature would typically use
any/all of the following properties
•

"CreateItem"

•

"Subject"

•

"Body"

•

"Attachment"

•

"Send"

4.3 Pattern Identification (feature extractor)
4.3.1 Application of Principal Component Analysis to the feature
extraction problem
VBScript language is quite a simple language for programming. Yet despite its
simplicity, the ability to get relations that combine a group of VBScript features can be
computationally intensive. The regular expressions used in the current problem are so
large and lies in the range of 243 elements of VBScript lexically related keywords,

50

functions, properties, or methods [44]. Accordingly, relations between patterns are hard
to find in data of high dimensions. The larger the elements that constitute the data, the
more difficult is identifying patterns by highlighting their similarities and differences.
As outlined earlier, there are several statistical multivariate techniques that are used to
deduce the relations among a data set. In particular, PCA (see Appendix C) is used to
reduce the dimensionality of data in which a large number of variables are interrelated.
PCA accomplishes this by computing a smaller set of uncorrelated variables which best
represent the original data. In this case, the use of Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
[57], [58] can greatly help in reducing the dimensionality of the problem while keeping
the significant “principal components” in the reduced data set. It is therefore desirable to
extract measurements that are invariant or insensitive to the variations within each class.
The process of extracting such measurements is labeled hereafter as “feature extraction”.
Thus, PCA is used as a feature extractor to extract patterns that will be used by the
classifier, which follows the feature extractor, to differentiate between normal and
malicious script.

4.3.2 Definition of Principal Component Analysis
As explained in chapter 3, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [58] represents a
classical statistical technique that is used to analyze the covariance structure of
Multivariate statistical observations. The idea behind PCA is quite old. It roots back to
Pearson [57] in 1901 as a methodology for fitting planes in the least-squares sense (like in
linear regression). It was Hotelling (1933) [57] who proposed this technique for the
purpose of analyzing the correlation structure between many random variables.
The purpose of PCA is to identify the dependence structure behind a Multivariate
stochastic observation in order to obtain a compact description of it. So, PCA replaces the
original highly correlated variables of a data set with a smaller number of less correlated
variables called the principal components. These principal components are the key
features of the random observation vector and in the IDS context can be used to
differentiate between benign and malicious script [57], [58].
If the original data set of dimension n contains highly correlated variables, then PCA
maps the data into a different space where each element represent a dimension of that

51

space, and by observing the relative sizes of the mapped-out data, only the higher
(principal) m components of the data are selected that describes most of the data. The
presence of fewer components (m) makes it easier to label each dimension with an
intuitive meaning. The n observed variables are thus represented as functions of m latent
variables called factors, where m < n (and often m << n). Thus, such analysis has a great
advantage of reducing the data dimensionality that might in many cases be of exponential
order while maintaining the information content [57].
In a statistical context the number n is called the superficial dimensionality of the data,
where m is called the intrinsic dimensionality of the data. The stronger the correlation
between the observed variables is, the smaller the number of independent variables (m)
that can adequately describe them [57].

4.3.3 Steps to perform PCA in feature extraction
As illustrated above, PCA [57] is a powerful tool for analyzing data; it is used to find
patterns in data of high dimensions by reducing the number of dimensions without loss of
information. The following represents the steps used by PCA to reduce the VBScript
elements’ dimensionality by identifying the correlation between them [58].
a. Data normalization.
b. Calculation of the covariance matrix and correlation matrix.
c. Calculation of the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the covariance matrix.
d. Choosing the principal components.

A parser (feature extractor) was developed (using the C language) to extract the existence
and occurrence of VBScript elements (attributes of a specific feature) in a code
population in Appendix A. This operation is applied on multiple files (benign and
malicious files) to develop the occurrence matrix of VBScript elements (regular
expression). The parser does the following functions to help analyze and understand how
relevant each feature under test is:
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a. Data Normalization
Following Cunningham’s approach [19], the problem of identifying features of common
benign code was translated to testing the occurrence and repetition (stated above) of
VBScript elements (regular expression) on the benign data set used for training the
extractor.
Collection of statistics around regular expression (VBScript elements):
As stated above, the parser collects statistics (occurrence and repetition) around
VBScript elements’ within the code population under test. A file that contains all
the VBScript elements is scanned over malicious and benign scripts. Each time
the regular expression (VBScript elements) finds a match within the code, this
match is recorded.
Mean and Variance calculation:
The feature extractor was designed to compute the mean14 (in Appendix B) of the
occurrence of VBScript elements for malicious and benign script.
The calculation of the mean value (the average).
µ =

1
n

n

∑

Xk .

(5)

k =1

Where µ indicates the mean of the set X in (5).
It also computes the variance 15 (in Appendix B) in order to show the spread of
data from the mean. Then, the parser runs over both malicious and benign code

14

The mean of a collection of numbers is their arithmetic average, computed by adding them up and

dividing by their number.

15

A measure of the average distance between each of a set of data points and their mean value; equal to the

sum of the squares of the deviation from the mean value.
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population to compute the Total Variance (TV), Variance for Clean (VC), and
Variance for Malicious (VM).
•

Total Variance (TV): is the computation of the variance for the code
population that constitutes both normal and malicious scripts.

•

Variance for Clean (VC): it is the calculation of the variance for normal
scripts code population.

•

Variance for Malicious (VM): it is the calculation of the variance for
malicious scripts code population.

The Total Variance Ratio (R) is computed as in the following equation (8), where the
objective is Total Variance Ratio (R) maximization. This could be achieved by dividing
the Total Variance (TV) by the Variance for clean (VC) multiplied by Weight1 16 and
Variance for malicious (VM) multiplied by Weight2 17 . Thus, the Total Variance (R) is
maximized for both Normal and Malicious codes.
The Total Variance Ratio (R) = (Weight1 * (TV/ VC) + Weight2 * (TV/VM)).

Vc

(8)

Vm

Elements
Figure 4. 2 : Elements of Primary filter

16
17

Weight 1is the total number of normal scripts divided by total number of normal and malicious scripts’ files.
Weight 2 is the total number of malicious scripts divided by total number of normal and malicious scripts’ files.
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The Variance for clean (VC), and the Variance for Malicious (VM) in the above Figure
4. 2 could be used as a Primary filter to differentiate between benign and malicious
scripts.
If Variance for clean (VC) of some VBScript elements records high value in clean
scripts, while it records zero value in malicious scripts, or vice versa; thus, these
VBScript elements are retained to be used as primary filter to differentiate between
normal and malicious scripts.
R

P: Selection threshold
Elements
Figure 4. 3 : Elements sorted according to their highest Total Variance Ratio (R)

After selecting the elements that will constitute the primary filter, the rest of VBScript
elements are sorted in descending order according to their Total Variance Ratio (R). A
threshold is set to select a number of elements P that have the highest Total Variance
Ratio (R), and discard those with lowest values. Thus, the elements’ size is reduced,
while retaining the most information see Figure 4. 3.
The following step illustrates the calculation of the covariance matrix P × P on these
reduced or selected number of VBScript elements P.

b. The Computation of the Covariance Matrix or the Correlation
matrix:
The rotation of the existing axis is computed by getting the Covariance between the
selected P elements. Thus, the covariance matrix (see Appendix B) is a square matrix of
dimension equal to P.
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The covariance Matrix or a correlation matrix18 is always measured between 2
dimensions as described in the following equation (6):
n

T
COV ( X , Y ) = (1 / n)∑ ( X k − X )(Yk − Y ) .

(6)

k =1

Where X and Y are the mean of the set X and Y.

The correlation between a pair of variables is equivalent to the covariance divided by the
product of the standard deviations of the two variables X and Y, as described in the
following formula (7):
Correlation matrix =

COV ( X , Y )
.
∂ X ∂Y

(7)

The correlation between the elements in the correlation matrix can be categorized as
follows:
•

Low correlation: the correlation between the elements is less than 30%.

•

Medium correlation: the correlation between the elements is in the band 30-70%.

•

And high correlation: the correlation between the ele ments is higher than 70%.

Thus, if two elements are highly correlated (correlation between the elements higher than
70%) in the correlation matrix; so, one element of them is selected, the one with the
highest Total Variance Ratio (R) in the computation of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors.
If there is no correlation between the elements or the correlation is low, all the elements
are taken into account to perform the computation of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors.

c. Computation of the Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors of the
Covariance matrix:
In this step, Eigen-decomposition is calculated by finding the roots eigenvalues and their
corresponding eigenvectors19 (in Appendix B). Matlab is used to perform this
18

The results of Correlation Matrix are the same as the Variance-Covariance Matrix because the correlation between a

pair of variables is equivalent to the covariance divided by the product of the standard deviations of both variables.
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computation of eigenvalues and eigenvectors. In general, once eigenvectors are computed
from the covariance matrix, then they are sorted according to their highest eigenvalues in
order to give the elements that constitute the components an order of significance. So, the
decision can easily be made at this stage to ignore the components of lesser significance
while keeping those of higher significance. The higher the eigenvalues, the more
characteristic features of a script does the particular eigenvector describe [58], [64].

d. Choosing the principal components
The eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue is the principal component of the data set
that points down the middle of the data. Elements with low eigenvalues can be omitted as
they only describe a small part of the characteristic features of the script.
A feature vector (eigenfeatures) is formed by setting a threshold to select a number of
elements (M’) from the list of eigenvectors that have the highest eigenvalues. Thus, the
elements’ size is reduced and these elements, which are easily used as the main principal
components, constitute the secondary filter to differentiate between normal and malicious
script.

4.4 Attack Classifier
Once the feature vector (The M’ significant eigenvectors of the covariance matrix P × P
are chosen as those with the largest associated eigenvalues) is created, identification
becomes a pattern recognition task.
Those eigenfeatures or (eigen VBScript elements) span an M’ dimensional subspace of
the original N VBScript elements space. This eigenfeature vector M’ is used to find
which of the two pre-defined classes (Normal or Malicious script) best describes the
script.
The simplest method for determining which class provides the best descriptio n of an
input script is to find the Euclidean distance [64] from the centre of both clean and
malicious codes.
19

Eigenvector is a vector which, when acted on by a particular linear transformation, produces a scalar multiple

of the original vector. The scalar in question is called the eigenvalue corresponding to this eigenvector.
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2

m

D = ∑ a ij − a
n
i

j =1

n
j

(9)

Where in (9) a jn is the mean (center) of each class Normal or Malicious script, and a ij
represents the script under test.

Script under test
Distance to Malicious

Distance to clean

Center of Clean script

Figure 4. 4 : The Computation of the Euclidean Distance from the center of both clean and malicious
codes.

Euclidean Distance [52], [64] as in Figure 4. 4 is a straight line distance used as a
measure of similarity in the nearest neighbor method. Classification based on this
distance measure is direct and simple where the mean values of the elements in malicious
or normal script are used as class centers. A script is classified as belonging to malicious
class, if the Distance to Malicious center is less than the Distance to Normal center.
Otherwise, it belongs to normal class. This means that when the minimum Euclidean
Distance Din is below some chosen threshold (h) from the center of benign data
population, a script can be categorized as benign script.
In testing the classifier, if a test sample is benign yet the measured Euclidean distance is
higher than the threshold, the case represents a false positive case. On the other hand if
the test sample is for a malicious script, and the measured distance is less than the
threshold, the case represents a false negative [8].
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It is clear from the above that the selection of that threshold has a key impact on the
accuracy of the classifier. Selecting a large threshold would lead to the generation of a
high false negative rate (missing detection), yet selecting a tight threshold would lead to
the generation of a high false positive rate (wrong detection).

4.5 Results Analysis & Validation
As stated earlier, the 2 main objectives of the work are:
•

To isolate features common to the malicious attacks, and

•

To propose an implementation for an attack classifier that would allow for using these
features in order to efficiently detect VBScript malicious attack.

4.5.1 Efficiency and performance measures
First in doing so, there is a need of setting measurements to quantify the system’s
efficiency. The following are measurements used in our experiments [8]:
1. There are four measures used, such as true positives, true negatives, false positives,
and false negatives.
•

A true positive is a malicious example that is correctly tagged as malicious.

•

A true negative is a benign example that is correctly classified as benign.

•

A false positive is a benign program that has been mislabeled by an algorithm as
malicious.

•

While, a false negative is a malicious executable that has been misclassified as a
benign program.

2. The detection rate is the number of malicious binaries correctly classified divided by
the total number of malicious programs tested.
For the ‘feature’, efficiency would be defined through the relation between the
percentage of feature hit to the population code (normal and malicious code), in other
words “how many abnormal feature elements are present in how much of the code
population”. According to that measure an efficient feature (a good representative of
malicious feature) will score high when applied over the malicious code population (and
alternatively will score low when applied over the normal code population). This
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efficiency measure will support demonstrating the validity of the 1st hypothesis. The
parsing system stated earlier allows for testing the efficiency of the isolated features.
For the ‘attack classifier’, efficiency would be defined as establishing a high rate of
attack detection with a low rate of false positive alarms. This measure will support
demonstrating the 2nd hypothesis. It will be depicted using ROC curves (Receiver
Operating Characteristic) [27], which are widely used to measure the effectiveness of an
intrusion detection system by plotting the likelihood that an intrusion is correctly detected
against the likelihood that a non- intrusion is misclassified (false positives). This will
allow for judging on the effectiveness of the system.
Both efficiency measures allow for validating the assumptions (hypotheses) upon which
the work is built.

4.5.2 Experiments for training and testing
Two types of experiments will be used to train and test the system:
1. Experiment over unseen VBScript: where a cross validation 20 [35] is used to
experiment the proposed system in estimating the results of detecting new
malicious VBScripts. K fold cross validation [35] is the standard method to
estimate the performance of predictions over unseen data, which means that the
data is divided into k subsets of approximately equal size. The system will be
trained k times, each time leaving out one of the subsets from training, but using
only the omitted set to compute whatever criterion.
The system will use five fold cross validation, where the population code (normal
and malicious scripts) will be partitioned into five equal size sets. Four of these
sets will be used for training the system and then the remaining set will be used
for evaluation. This process will be repeated five times by leaving out a different
set for testing every time. The results of these tests will be averaged to obtain a
measure of how the system performs in detecting new malicious VBScript. This

20

Cross validation is a method aiming at estimating the error of a hypothesis, generated by a concept learning

algorithm (classifier).
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method is envisaged to give a reliable measure of the new system’s accuracy on
unseen data.
2. Experiment over known VBScript: this experiment will evaluate the performance
of the system on detecting known VBScripts. For this task, the system will
generate detection for the entire training set of data (normal and malicious code
population). This means that the same data set will be used for training and for
testing the system.

4.6 Conclusion
The work introduced in this chapter is an extension on a similar research line followed by
Cunningham [19]. The proposed system is an anomaly host based IDS that provides
protection against web attacks from malicious VBScripts.
It is based on two important hypotheses: the 1st hypothesis is that the majority of
malicious codes exhibit different behaviors in comparison to normal codes, at the same
time whether the codes within each group share common patterns. While the 2nd
hypothesis assumes that the code patterns exhibited in malicious VBScripts are unique to
attack codes and record very low presence in normal VBScripts.
To prove the validity of the hypotheses proposed, a large data set was collected for both
normal and malicious scripts in order to study the nature of normal VBScrip ts and detect
how malicious script deviates from the normal profile.
Moreover, the proposed technique comprises two significant components: a feature
extractor (pattern identification) and an attack classifier.
The proposed feature extractor is based on a Multivariate Statistical technique, Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) [57] that extracts common patterns to distinguish between
normal and malicious script. PCA analysis is carried on the proposed problem to reduce
the dimensionality of the problem while keeping the significant “principal components”
in the reduced data set. Thus, PCA highlights the key differences between patterns of
benign and malicious scripts.
An attack classifier, which follows the feature extractor, uses the Euclidean distance [64]
to learn the best combination of feature elements in order to categorize the incoming
script into normal or malicious code.
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The following chapter presents an analysis of the results of the proposed system in order
to demonstrate the validity of the hypotheses proposed.
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Chapter 5: Results Analysis and Validation

5.1 Introduction
As outlined in chapter 4, the development of IDS passed by three main stages: malicious
code study, pattern identification and development of the attack classifier. This chapter
will go through the detailed steps taken in order to generate the results in each stage of
the IDS development and analyze them. A key outcome as well is to verify the initial
assumptions (hypothesis) on which the work is built. Finally, the methodology used in
testing with the results will be presented and discussed.

5.2 Input Data Analysis
To test the proposed system, the first stage of the work focused on building a collection
of both normal (non- malicious) and malicious codes. Malicious script source codes (as
stated in the previous chapter) were gathered from various sources, and it was possible to
collect a population of VBS attacks representing exactly 283 malicious VBScript attacks
(see Appendix D) known (on McAfee and Symantec databases).
The study of the malicious code revealed that the attack source codes usually perform one
of the following actions:
•

Access the registry

•

Access the user’s mailing list

•

Launch tasks

•

Create users and groups

•

Change user’s permissions

•

Change and create files

•

Change the directory structure
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It was thus essential to build the benign code population that covers both complete
applications as well as short task-specific scripts. The collected population of benign
scripts is in the actual of 1113 normal scripts in Appendix D, as described in Table 5. 1
below
In general, the benign data set was collected to maintain the diversity of the following
source code properties such as:
•

Nature of task performed: the benign scripts were collected to cover a wide range
of application including the actions that were identified earlier during the study of
the malicious code.

•

Source: the benign data was collected from a variety of sources in order to make
sure that it covers a wide range of programming styles.

Table 5. 1: The population of collected benign and malicious scripts

Malicious

Benign

283

1113

Script files

The feature elements of the VBScript language are the various VBScript related
keywords such as methods, properties, and functions available in the language. The y are
exactly 243 elements in total. The following Table 5. 2 shows the feature elements of
VBScript used in the analysis [69], [70].

Table 5. 2: Total VBScript elements or VBScript lexically related keywords used in the feature
list [69], [70].
Abs(
Array(
Asc(
Atn(

IsArray(
IsDate(
IsEmpty(
IsNull(

StrReverse(
Tan(
Time
Timer

CBool(
CByte(
CCur(
CDate(
CDbl(
Chr(
CInt(
CLng(
Cos(
CreateObject(

IsNumeric(
IsObject(
Join(
LBound(
LCase(
Left(
Len(
LoadPicture(
Log(
LTrim(

TimeSerial(
TimeValue(
TypeName(
UBound(
UCase(
Unescape(
VarType(
Weekday(
WeekdayName(
Year(

RegRead(
RegWrite(
Remove(
RemoveNetworkDrive(
RemovePrinterConnect
ion(
Run(
Save
SendKeys(
SetDefaultPrinter(
ShowUsage
Sign (
SignFile (
Skip(
SkipLine
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Named
Number
Path
ProcessID

.Environment(
.Error
.ExitCode
.FullName

RelativePath
ScriptFullName
ScriptName
Source
SourceText
SpecialFolders(
Status
StdErr
StdIn
StdOut

.Hotkey =
.IconLocation =
.Interactive
.Item(
.length
.Line
.Name
.Named
.Number
.Path

CSng(

RTrim(

CStr(
Date
DateAdd(
DateDiff(
DatePart(
DateSerial(

Trim(
Mid(
Minute(
Month(
MonthName(
MsgBox(

DateValue(
Day(

Now
Oct(

Escape(
Eval(

Replace(
RGB(

Exp(

Right(

Filter(
FormatCurrency(

Rnd(
Round(

FormatDateTime(

GetLocale(

ScriptEngine
ScriptEngineBuildV
ersion
ScriptEngineMajor
Version
ScriptEngineMinor
Version

GetObject(
GetRef(

Second(
SetLocale(

Hex(
Hour(
InputBox(
InStr(
InStrRev(
Int(
Fix(

Sgn(
Sin(
Space(
Split(
Sqr(
StrComp(
String(

FormatNumber(
FormatPercent(

AddPrinterConn
ection(
AddWindowsPri
nterConnection(
AppActivate
Close
ConnectObject(
Count
CreateObject(
CreateScript(
CreateShortcut(
DisconnectObjec
t(
echo
EnumNetworkDr
ives
EnumPrinterCon
nections
Exec(

Sleep(

TargetPath

.ProcessID

Terminate
Verify (
VerifyFile (
Write(
WriteBlankLines(
WriteLine(

Unnamed
UserDomain
UserName
Version
WindowStyle
WorkingDirectory
HKEY_CURRENT
_USER
HKCU
HKEY_LOCAL_M
ACHINE
HKLM
HKEY_CLASSES_
ROOT

.RelativePath
.ScriptFullName
.ScriptName
.Source
.SourceText
.SpecialFolders(

HKCR
HKEY_USERS
HKEY_CURRENT
_CONFIG

.Unnamed
.UserDomain

.Version

Arguments
AtEndOfLine
AtEndOfStream
BuildVersion
Character
Column
ComputerName

Execute

CurrentDirectory

Exists(
ExpandEnviron
mentStrings(

Description
Environment(

WScript
("WScript.Network"
)

GetObject(

Error

("WScript.Shell")

getResource(
LogEvent(
MapNetworkDri
ve(
Popup(
Quit(
Read(
ReadAll
ReadLine
RegDelete (

ExitCode
FullName

.Arguments
.AtEndOfLine

Hotkey
IconLocation
Interactive
Item(
length
Line
Name

.AtEndOfStream
.BuildVersion
.Character
.Column
.ComputerName
.CurrentDirectory
.Description

.Status
.StdErr
.StdIn
.StdOut
.TargetPath

.UserName

.WindowStyle
.WorkingDirectory
.PrivateProfileString
(
.ProfileString(
Clear
Raise
replace
Test(

5.3 Parser design and operation
In order to be able to test the presence of specific features in the code, it was essential to
develop a tool that would help extracting the features from the benign data set described
above. A program was developed (hereafter called ‘the parser’) see Appendix A. A parser
was developed in C language due to its flexibility in file manipulation; it performs the
following tasks:
1. Reading a parameter file that includes the features whose presence is required to
be tested, as well as the location of the source codes.
2. Looping over the source codes and tests the occurrence of each of the elements in
the features’ list.
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3. Building a matrix containing the repetition of each element in the features’ list
(the rows represent the source codes and the columns represent the features’
elements).
4. Building another matrix containing the occurrence (if the repetition is higher than
one, the occurrence flag is set to one, otherwise it is set to zero).
5. Performing correlation analysis between the elements.
6. Writing the results of the analysis onto an output file showing the parsing as well
as the statistical analysis.

5.4 Multivariate Statistical Analysis: PCA
5.4.1 Data Normalization
The feature extractor (parser) was designed to compute the mean of the occurrence of
VBScript elements for malicious and benign script. It also computes the variance in order
to show the spread of the data from the mean. The Variance for clean (VC), the Variance
for Malicious (VM), and the total variance Ratio (R) were computed for clean and
malicious scripts (combined code population).
After applying the Parser on the benign data set using the feature elements outlined
above, the next step is to narrow down the features selection from the current set of 243
elements to a reduced and more descriptive set of feature elements that best describe the
benign behavior.
This is done over a series of steps that filters the number of elements in order to reach a
reduced set of high significance (principal components). These steps are,
a. Elimination of low usage elements: By computing the total variance Ratio R (over
the combined code population). The elements corresponding to low R values
represent elements which are rarely used see Table 5. 3 In the following analysis,
the cutoff is taken as R = 0.
Table 5. 3: Low Usage Elements

Atn(

oct(

createscript(

skip(

Ccur(

scriptenginebuildversion

disconnectobject(

.currentdirectory

Dateadd(

setlocale(

enumprinterconnections

.exitcode
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datepart(

tan(

getresource(

.hotkey =

dateserial(

timeserial(

logevent(

.relativepath

formatcurrency( weekday(

mapnetworkdrive(

.sourcetext

formatdatetime( weekdayname(

removenetworkdrive(

.stderr

formatpercent(

addprinterconnection(

removeprinterconnection( .profilestring(

getref(

addwindowsprinterconnection( sendkeys(

Rtrim(

connectobject(

signfile (

This step managed to reduce 18% (43 elements) of the initial elements set. The
eliminated elements include for example mathematical functions (e.g. Atn, Tan,
..) which are not commonly used in VBScript (being a non-technical script
language). It also contains string manipulation elements (e.g. formatpercent, ..)
which are usually handled by the html page.

Two cascaded filters such as primary and secondary filters are used by the attack
classifier as described below:

b. Primary filter:
1. Selection of elements with high VC : After computing the variance over the
clean code set, the elements that score high over the benign code while
maintaining a low variance over the malicious code, is selected as the first set of
elements to be used in the classifier. In the following analysis, elements with VM
= 0 with high VC are selected.
In this step approximately (22 %) 53 of VBScript elements are retained to be used
in the primary filter to differentiate between normal and malicious scripts
illustrate in Table 5. 4 below.
Table 5. 4: Elements used in the primary filter to detect normal scripts.

array(

.scriptname

cdbl(

.unnamed

quit(

lbound(

getlocale(

cos(

.version

year(

regdelete(

csng(
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isnull(

.column

fix(

eval(

showusage

.userdomain

strcomp(

loadpicture(

cbool(

isdate(

sleep(

monthname(

.stdout

typename(

test(

sgn(

log(

terminate

formatnumber(

skipline

isempty(

.interactive

scriptengineminorversion .atendofline

verify (

datevalue(

sqr(

.buildversion

cint(

filter(

vartype(

.character

isobject(

timevalue(

setdefaultprinter(

remove(

.processid

verifyfile (

.error

raise

.stdin

2. Selection of elements with high VM: elements that have high variance over
malicious code set and low variance over clean code set. It can be used as a
source of differentiation in the primary filter by reciprocating its presence, i.e.
by detecting its ‘absence’. This process led to the selection of 5 elements.

Table 5. 5: Elements used in the primary filter to detect malicious scripts.

.privateprofilestring(

appactivate

regwrite(

regedit(

Cbyte(

After selecting the elements that will constitute the primary filter, the rest of VBScript
elements are sorted in descending order according to their Total Variance Ratio (R) as
shown in the following Figure 5. 1.
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sgn(
.privateprofilestring(

sleep(
vartype(
cos(

datevalue(
cdbl(

isempty(
.error
.userdomain

count
.workingdirectory
isnull(

execute
.username

("wscript.network")

hkcr
clng(
instrrev(
hkey_current_config

string(
timer

array(
int(
hour(

exists(
.specialfolders(
replace(

writeline(
month(

write(

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
.description
hex(

Total Variance Ratio (R)

Total Variance Ratio(R) soreted in descending order

VB Script Elements

Figure 5. 1 : Total Variance Ratio(R)

c. The R factor test
In this step, a threshold is set to select a number of elements P that have the highest
Total Variance Ratio (R), and discard those with lowest values. Thus, 20 % of the
elements that have the highest Total Variance Ratio (R) are selected, so the
elements’ size is reduced while retaining the most information as illustrated in
Figure 5. 2, and Table 5. 6.
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10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

R(max)

VBScript Elements

Figure 5. 2 : The R factor test.

Table 5. 6: The selection of 20% (a cutoff threshold) of the elements that have the highest Total
Variance Ratio (R).

.number

.scriptfullname

.arguments

write(

cstr(

writeline(

.specialfolders(

replace(

array(

scriptengine

readall

wscript

hkey_users

hkey_current_user

clng(

ltrim(

Second(

hex(

rgb(

hkey_local_machine

hkey_classes_root

echo

asc(

writeblanklines(

.description

rnd(

getobject(

The above group of keywords was found to strongly correlate in VBScript attacks. By
analyzing these keywords, two distinct subcategories can be identified:
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.windowstyle

.fullname

.iconlocation =

.item(

trim(

sin(

sign (

instr(

datediff(

ubound(

hklm

strreverse(

chr(

("wscript.shell")

read(

.targetpath

exec(

hkey_users
scriptenginemajorve
rsion
rnd(

day(

20% (a cutoff threshold) of R(max)

elements

Total Variance Ratio (R)

Total Variance Ratio (R)

Registry related keywords (hkey_users, hkey_classes_root, hkey_current_user,
hkey_local_machine ), and these are mostly used in attacks in order to register the
virus on the infected machine, which is generally done by installing a registry key.
File structure related keywords (.specialfolders(), write(), writeline(), replace(),
writeblanklines( ), readall), and these are VBScript keywords which are used to alter
the file structure.
It is worth noting that the presence of any of the above elements, individually, does not
provide enough evidence for suspecting an attack, yet it is the combination of all/most of
the above at the measured correlation factors which provides such evidence.

5.4.2 The Computation of the Covariance Matrix (or the Correlation
matrix)
As stated in the previous chapter, the rotation of the existing axis is computed by getting
the Covariance between the selected P elements (reduced VBScript elements). Therefore,
the covariance matrix is a square matrix (symmetric matrix) of dimension equal to P; the
number of selected elements is P = 27, the covariance matrix will be 27 × 27.
The following Figure 5. 3, Figure 5. 4, Figure 5. 5 represent a color map of the calculated
covariance matrix P × P over malicious, normal, and combined (both normal and
malicious) scripts.
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Malicious
.number
cstr(
.number
0 0.01
cstr(
0.01
0
array(
0.02 0.01
hkey_users
0.11 0.01
second(
0.02 0.01
hkey_classes_root
0.04 0.02
.description
0.01
0
.scriptfullname 0.02 0.07
writeline(
0.06 0.03
scriptengine
0.03 0.01
hkey_current_user
0.07 0.13
hex(
0.01
0
echo
0.07 0.03
rnd(
0.02 0.01
.arguments
0.02 0.01
.specialfolders( 0.03 0.01
readall
0.18 0.05
clng(
0.02 0.01
rgb(
0.01
0
asc(
0.05 0.17
getobject(
0.02 0.01
write(
0.01 0.03
replace(
0.15 0.02
wscript
0.02 0.09
ltrim(
0.01
0
hkey_local_machine
0.03 0.03
writeblanklines( 0.02 0.01

.arguments
.specialfolders(
readallclng(
0.02 0.03 0.18 0.02
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01
0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02
0.02 0.04 0.05 0.02
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
0.18 0.05 0.22 0.03
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01
0.12 0.14 0.29 0.09
0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05
0.02 0.03 0.06 0.02
0.06 0.09 0.17 0.23
0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01
0.15 0.1 0.04 0.05
0.02 0.03 0.14 0.02
0 0.03 0.16 0.01
0.03
0 0.17 0.02
0.16 0.17
0 0.12
0.01 0.02 0.12
0
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01
0.05 0.07 0.17 0.04
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
0 0.1 0.08 0.05
0.05 0.08 0.13 0.04
0.08 0.13 0.37 0.06
0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01
0.08 0.05 0.18 0.06
0.02 0.03 0.09 0.02

rgb(
0.01
0
0.37
0.01
0.01
0.02
0
0.07
0.03
0.01
0.03
0
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.01
0
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.09
0
0.03
0.01

asc( getobject(
write( replace(
wscript
0.05 0.02 0.01 0.15
0.02
0.17 0.01 0.03 0.02
0.09
0.05 0.17 0.03 0.07
0.05
0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02
0.07
0.04 0.01 0.06 0.05
0.01
0.04 0.09 0.05 0.02
0.16
0.02 0.5 0.03 0.02
0.04
0.11 0.08 0.15 0.26
0.72
0.19 0.05 0.3 0.32
0.06
0.08 0.16 0.18 0.07
0.06
0.09 0.11 0.06 0.02
0.15
0.17 0.01 0.03 0.02
0.04
0.16 0.06 0.03 0.11
0.07
0.05 0.02 0.09 0.06
0.05
0.05 0.02
0 0.05
0.08
0.07 0.02 0.1 0.08
0.13
0.17 0.02 0.08 0.13
0.37
0.04 0.01 0.05 0.04
0.06
0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
0.09
0 0.06 0.08 0.09
0.24
0.06
0 0.06 0.05
0.01
0.08 0.06
0 0.25
0.04
0.09 0.05 0.25
0
0.13
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0
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0.17
0 0.2 0.12
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0
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Figure 5. 3: Color map of Elements’ Correlation for Malicious codes

0.29

array(hkey_users
second(
hkey_classes_root
.description
.scriptfullname
writeline(
scriptengine
hkey_current_user
hex( echo rnd(
0.02 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.02
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
0 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.13
0 0.03 0.01
0 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01
0 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.03
0.03
0 0.02 0.12 0.01
0 0.08 0.03 0.3 0.01 0.07 0.1
0.02 0.02
0 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.27 0.01 0.06 0.02
0.04 0.12 0.21
0 0.02 0.11
0 0.13 0.16 0.02 0.08 0.04
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
0 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.13
0 0.03 0.01
0
0 0.02 0.11 0.07
0 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.09
0.07 0.08 0.05
0 0.03 0.08
0 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.07
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.08
0 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.03
0.07 0.3 0.27 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.06 0.04
0 0.03 0.04 0.17
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
0 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03
0 0.03 0.01
0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.03
0 0.02
0.03 0.1 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.02
0
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.15 0.02
0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.1 0.03
0.05 0.05 0.02 0.22 0.05 0.29 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.04 0.14
0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.23 0.01 0.05 0.02
0.37 0.01 0.01 0.02
0 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.03
0 0.03 0.01
0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.05
0.17 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.5 0.08 0.05 0.16 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.02
0.03 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.3 0.18 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.09
0.07 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.32 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.06
0.05 0.07 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.72 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.04 0.07 0.05
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
0 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03
0 0.03 0.01
0.09 0.17
0 0.18 0.03 0.13 0.16
0 0.38 0.03 0.08 0.12
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01
0 0.3 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.22 0.03
low correlation

0.59
1

Medium correlation
Highly correlated

ltrim(
0.01
0
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0
0.05
0.03
0.01
0.03
0
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.07
0.01
0
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.04
0
0.03
0.01

hkey_local_machine
writeblanklines(
0.03 0.02
0.03 0.01
0.09 0.03
0.17 0.03
0 0.02
0.18 0.05
0.03 0.01
0.13
0
0.16 0.3
0 0.03
0.38 0.17
0.03 0.01
0.08 0.22
0.12 0.03
0.08 0.02
0.05 0.03
0.18 0.09
0.06 0.02
0.03 0.01
0.17 0.05
0 0.02
0.2 0.02
0.12
0
0.33 0.1
0.03 0.01
0 0.07
0.07
0
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Normal
.number
cstr(
.number
0 0.43
cstr(
0.43
0
array(
0.21 0.24
hkey_users
0.12 0.01
second(
0.01 0.01
hkey_classes_root
0.2 0.02
.description
0.48 0.36
.scriptfullname 0.12 0.05
writeline(
0.08 0.15
scriptengine 0.15 0.01
hkey_current_user
0.03 0.02
hex(
0.42 0.42
echo
0.11 0.11
rnd(
0.02 0.01
.arguments
0.39 0.34
.specialfolders( 0.03 0.02
readall
0 0.03
clng(
0.4 0.46
rgb(
0.02 0.01
asc(
0.02 0.01
getobject(
0.05 0.07
write(
0.05 0.07
replace(
0.02 0.01
wscript
0.29 0.21
ltrim(
0.19 0.1
hkey_local_machine
0.12 0.19
writeblanklines( 0.2 0.02

rgb(
0.02
0.01
0.11
0
0.5
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0
0.01
0.05
0.06
0
0.03
0
0.01
0.01
0
0
0.07
0.07
0
0.01
0.07
0
0.01

asc(
0.02
0.01
0.02
0
0
0.01
0.09
0.16
0.14
0
0
0.01
0.05
0.67
0.02
0.23
0
0.01
0
0
0.06
0.06
0
0.22
0.03
0
0.01

getobject(
write( replace(
wscript
0.05 0.05 0.02
0.29
0.07 0.07 0.01
0.21
0.11 0.11 0.02
0.08
0.05 0.05
0
0.27
0.04 0.04
0
0
0.01 0.01 0.01
0.16
0.1 0.1 0.02
0.16
0.03 0.03 0.01
0.04
0.12 0.12 0.12
0.03
0.06 0.06
0
0.22
0.09 0.09 0.01
0.12
0.07 0.07 0.02
0.08
0.24 0.24 0.03
0
0.06 0.06
0
0.22
0.04 0.04 0.03
0.22
0.09 0.09
0
0.01
0.05 0.05 0.16
0.05
0.02 0.02 0.01
0.31
0.07 0.07
0
0.01
0.06 0.06
0
0.22
0
1 0.01
0.1
1
0 0.01
0.1
0.01 0.01
0
0.09
0.1 0.1 0.09
0
0.12 0.12 0.02
0.07
0.05 0.05
0
0.27
0.05 0.05 0.07
0.28

Figure 5. 4: Color map of Elements’ Correlation for Normal codes
.arguments
.specialfolders(
readallclng(
0.39 0.03
0 0.4
0.34 0.02 0.03 0.46
0.45 0.03 0.03 0.14
0.1
0
0 0.01
0.01
0
0
0
0.16 0.01 0.01 0.33
0.22 0.03
0 0.29
0.09 0.11 0.01 0.4
0.21 0.1 0.08 0.02
0.12
0
0 0.01
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.54 0.02 0.02 0.33
0.3 0.05 0.03 0.14
0.02
0
0 0.01
0 0.03 0.05 0.32
0.03
0 0.01 0.01
0.05 0.01
0 0.01
0.32 0.01 0.01
0
0.03
0 0.01 0.01
0.02 0.23
0 0.01
0.04 0.09 0.05 0.02
0.04 0.09 0.05 0.02
0.03
0 0.16 0.01
0.22 0.01 0.05 0.31
0.33 0.06 0.07 0.12
0.1
0
0 0.26
0.15 0.01 0.03 0.2
0.29

array(hkey_users
second(
hkey_classes_root
.description
.scriptfullname
writeline(
scriptengine
hkey_current_user
hex( echo rnd(
0.21 0.12 0.01 0.2 0.48 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.03 0.42 0.11 0.02
0.24 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.36 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.42 0.11 0.01
0 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.42 0.09 0.02
0.02
0
0 0.42 0.12
0
0 0.82 0.47 0.16 0.04
0
0.08
0
0
0 0.01
0
0
0
0 0.01 0.03
0
0.04 0.42
0
0 0.19 0.5 0.01 0.35 0.19 0.27 0.1 0.01
0.16 0.12 0.01 0.19
0 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.03 0.3 0.21 0.09
0.04
0
0 0.5 0.11
0 0.06 0.01 0.18 0.18 0.04 0.01
0.05
0
0 0.01 0.08 0.06
0 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.07 0.01
0.03 0.82
0 0.35 0.14 0.01 0.01
0 0.38 0.2 0.05
0
0.03 0.47
0 0.19 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.38
0 0.06 0.03
0
0.42 0.16 0.01 0.27 0.3 0.18 0.13 0.2 0.06
0 0.19 0.01
0.09 0.04 0.03 0.1 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.19
0 0.05
0.02
0
0 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01
0
0 0.01 0.05
0
0.45 0.1 0.01 0.16 0.22 0.09 0.21 0.12 0.02 0.54 0.3 0.02
0.03
0
0 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.1
0 0.01 0.02 0.05
0
0.03
0
0 0.01
0 0.01 0.08
0 0.01 0.02 0.03
0
0.14 0.01
0 0.33 0.29 0.4 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.33 0.14 0.01
0.11
0 0.5 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
0 0.01 0.05 0.06
0
0.02
0
0 0.01 0.09 0.16 0.14
0
0 0.01 0.05 0.67
0.11 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.1 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.24 0.06
0.11 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.1 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.24 0.06
0.02
0
0 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.12
0 0.01 0.02 0.03
0
0.08 0.27
0 0.16 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.12 0.08
0 0.22
0.06 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.21 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.83 0.06
0.11
0
0
0 0.02
0
0
0
0 0.16 0.04
0
0.05 0.21 0.01 0.36 0.07 0.33 0.02 0.17 0.35 0.1 0.05 0.01
low correlation

0.59
1

Medium correlation
Highly correlated

ltrim( hkey_local_machine
writeblanklines(
0.19 0.12 0.2
0.1 0.19 0.02
0.06 0.11 0.05
0.03
0 0.21
0.04
0 0.01
0.08
0 0.36
0.21 0.02 0.07
0.09
0 0.33
0.08
0 0.02
0.04
0 0.17
0.07
0 0.35
0.14 0.16 0.1
0.83 0.04 0.05
0.06
0 0.01
0.33 0.1 0.15
0.06
0 0.01
0.07
0 0.03
0.12 0.26 0.2
0.07
0 0.01
0.03
0 0.01
0.12 0.05 0.05
0.12 0.05 0.05
0.02
0 0.07
0.07 0.27 0.28
0 0.03 0.13
0.03
0 0.01
0.13 0.01
0
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Combined
.number
cstr(
.number
0 0.42
cstr(
0.42
0
array(
0.21 0.24
hkey_users
0.06 0.02
second(
0.02 0.01
hkey_classes_root
0.09 0.03
.description
0.47 0.36
.scriptfullname 0.05 0.05
writeline(
0.01 0.05
scriptengine 0.06 0.02
hkey_current_user
0.01 0.02
hex(
0.41 0.42
echo
0.13 0.12
rnd(
0.03 0.02
.arguments
0.39 0.34
.specialfolders( 0.04 0.02
readall
0.04 0.05
clng(
0.37 0.44
rgb(
0.02 0.01
asc(
0.05 0.01
getobject(
0.01 0.02
write(
0.06 0.04
replace(
0.18 0.11
wscript
0.15 0.07
ltrim(
0.09 0.15
hkey_local_machine
0.09 0.02
writeblanklines( 0.03 0.02

rgb(
0.02
0.01
0.13
0.01
0.2
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.05
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0
0.01
0.06
0.01
0.01
0.08
0
0.02
0.01

asc(
0.05
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.13
0.24
0.09
0.02
0.01
0.14
0.1
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.07
0.01
0.03
0.01

getobject(
write( replace(
wscript
0.01 0.06 0.18
0.15
0.02 0.04 0.11
0.07
0.16 0.05 0.03
0.04
0.08 0.1 0.09
0.05
0.06 0.01 0.01
0
0.07 0.09 0.11
0.11
0.17 0.07 0.06
0.17
0.33 0.17 0.03
0.29
0.2 0.35 0.27
0.09
0.07 0.18 0.06
0.05
0.17 0.17 0.09
0.11
0.11 0.05 0.03
0.12
0.31 0.12 0.09
0.66
0.08 0.11 0.06
0
0.11 0.07 0.09
0.28
0.11 0.02 0.02
0.09
0.27 0.29 0.21
0.19
0 0.03 0.17
0.11
0.06 0.01 0.01
0.08
0.14 0.17 0.17
0.07
0 0.19 0.16
0.05
0.19
0 0.27
0.06
0.16 0.27
0
0.02
0.05 0.06 0.02
0
0.04 0.01 0.14
0.04
0.12 0.26 0.24
0.2
0.05 0.02 0.09
0.07

Figure 5. 5: Color map of Elements’ Correlation for Combined codes
.arguments
.specialfolders(
readallclng(
0.39 0.04 0.04 0.37
0.34 0.02 0.05 0.44
0.45 0.04 0.06 0.13
0.02 0.01 0.11 0.01
0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01
0.1 0.02 0.22 0.18
0.24 0.04 0.09 0.28
0.07 0.18 0.53 0.1
0.05 0.04 0.2 0.03
0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01
0.05 0.02 0.29 0.04
0.54 0.03 0.06 0.31
0.31 0.02 0.13 0.12
0.03 0.01 0.15 0.01
0 0.04 0.06 0.31
0.04
0 0.17 0.02
0.06 0.17
0
0
0.31 0.02
0
0
0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02
0.11 0.11 0.27
0
0.07 0.02 0.29 0.03
0.09 0.02 0.21 0.17
0.28 0.09 0.19 0.11
0.08 0.01 0.04 0.2
0.03 0.06 0.28 0.09
0.02 0.01
0 0.01
0.29

array(hkey_users
second(
hkey_classes_root
.description
.scriptfullname
writeline(
scriptengine
hkey_current_user
hex( echo rnd(
0.21 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.47 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.41 0.13 0.03
0.24 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.36 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.42 0.12 0.02
0 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.1 0.03
0 0.07 0.41 0.11 0.03
0.03
0 0.01 0.21 0.03 0.09 0.1 0.18 0.35 0.05
0 0.09
0.02 0.01
0 0.16 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.05 0.01
0.05 0.21 0.16
0 0.09 0.25 0.04 0.21 0.2 0.15 0.01 0.01
0.18 0.03 0.02 0.09
0 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.31 0.23 0.03
0.1 0.09 0.05 0.25 0.08
0 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.02 0.16 0.02
0.03 0.1 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.16
0 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.02
0 0.18 0.01 0.21 0.05 0.14 0.02
0 0.15 0.09 0.03 0.01
0.07 0.35 0.23 0.2 0.03 0.23 0.13 0.15
0 0.01 0.06 0.16
0.41 0.05 0.01 0.15 0.31 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.01
0 0.2 0.02
0.11
0 0.05 0.01 0.23 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.2
0 0.06
0.03 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.06
0
0.45 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.24 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.54 0.31 0.03
0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.06 0.11 0.06 0.22 0.09 0.53 0.2 0.03 0.29 0.06 0.13 0.15
0.13 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.28 0.1 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.31 0.12 0.01
0.13 0.01 0.2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.01
0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.24 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.1
0.16 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.17 0.33 0.2 0.07 0.17 0.11 0.31 0.08
0.05 0.1 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.35 0.18 0.17 0.05 0.12 0.11
0.03 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.27 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.06
0.04 0.05
0 0.11 0.17 0.29 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.66
0
0.08
0
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01
0 0.01 0.13 0.02
0
0.03 0.21 0.03 0.29 0.01 0.33 0.19 0.09 0.42 0.03 0.13 0.1
0.03 0.18 0.01 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.22 0.18 0.23 0.05 0.04 0.01
low correlation

0.59
1

Medium correlation
Highly correlated

ltrim( hkey_local_machine
writeblanklines(
0.09 0.09 0.03
0.15 0.02 0.02
0.08 0.03 0.03
0 0.21 0.18
0 0.03 0.01
0.01 0.29 0.16
0.02 0.01 0.03
0.03 0.33 0.06
0.01 0.19 0.22
0 0.09 0.18
0.01 0.42 0.23
0.13 0.03 0.05
0.02 0.13 0.04
0 0.1 0.01
0.08 0.03 0.02
0.01 0.06 0.01
0.04 0.28
0
0.2 0.09 0.01
0 0.02 0.01
0.01 0.03 0.01
0.04 0.12 0.05
0.01 0.26 0.02
0.14 0.24 0.09
0.04 0.2 0.07
0 0.01
0
0.01
0 0.18
0 0.18
0

74

After the computation of the correlation matrix for malicious, normal, and combined
scripts (normal and malicious scripts together), the correlation between the elements in
the three matrices is inconsistent; this implies that all the elements are needed to be taken
into account (i.e. there is no correlation between them) to perform the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors computation.

5.4.3 Eigenvectors and Eigenvalues
Matlab is used to perform the computation of eigenvalues and eigenvectors. In general,
once the eigenvectors are computed from the covariance matrix, and then they are sorted
according to their highest eigenvalues to give the elements that constitute the components
an order of significance. So, the decision can easily be made at this stage to ignore the
components of lesser significance while keeping those of higher significance, see Table
5. 7.

Table 5. 7: Elements sorted in descending order according to their eigenvalues

3.70
3.35
1.92
1.54
1.44
1.24
1.20
1.10
1.07
1.04
1.00
0.94
0.87
0.80
0.78
0.77
0.70
0.69
0.61
0.53
0.49
0.48

Write
Readall
.scriptfullname
asc(
day(
.description
getobject(
hkey_current_user
hkey_users
hex(
second(
cstr(
minute(
scriptenginemajorversion
writeline(
scriptengine
.line
rnd(
month(
Space(
escape(
unescape(
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0.46
0.41
0.37
0.30
0.18
0.00

exec(
Exists(
computername
.arguments
createshortcut
targetpath

5.4.4 Selection of Principal Components
The resulting principal components were ordered according to their highest eigenvalues
and several trials were taken in order to select the optimal number of principal
components. The selection was bounded by the fact that selecting a high number of
components will increase the system accuracy yet on the expense of complicating the
calculations. On the other side, reducing the number of principal components on which
the system is build would simplify its design yet would sacrifice the quality of the
detection.
Several trials led to selecting 70% (as a cutoff threshold) to select the principal
components. This choice led the selection of 20 elements representing the principal
components of the system, as shown in Table 5. 8 below, these principal components,
constitute the secondary filter to differentiate between normal and malicious scripts
without sacrificing the system accuracy such as the high detection rate, and low rate of
false alarms.
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Table 5. 8: The feature vectors (the principal components) that constitute the secondary
filter:
Write
Readall
.scriptfullname
asc(
day(
.description
getobject(
hkey_current_user
hkey_users
hex(
second(
cstr(
minute(
scriptenginemajorversion
writeline(
scriptengine
.line
rnd(
month(
Space(

These keywords can be identified in two distinct subcategories inVBScript attacks such
as:
Registry related keywords (hkey_users, hkey_current_user) which are mostly used in
attacks to register the virus on the infected machine
File structure related keywords (getobject, write(), writeline(), readall) which are
used to alter the file structure
The presence of all these elements in a script provides enough evidence for suspecting an
attack.
Figure 5. 6 illustrates this by plotting the first two principal components that have higher
significance. Principal component 1 (Write) on the X axis against principal component 2
(readall) on the Y axis for normal and malicious scripts. These two principal components
can easily identify and separate malicious from normal scripts.
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Cluster Separation
12%
10%
Readall

8%
Normal class

6%

Malicious class

4%
2%
0%
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Write

Figure 5. 6 : The relation between Principal Component 1 (Write) and Principal Component 2
(Readall) that separates malicious from normal scripts.

5.5 Testing & Results
Detection will be based on Euclidean distance measured from the center of benign code
(the mean of the class of normal script). Two detection methods were assumed based on
whether the center of malicious code is used or not.
1. Detection Method 1: A code is malicious if the distance from the center of
benign code is greater than the distance from the center of malicious code, i.e. the
code is closer to the center of the malicious code than to the benign. In this
detection method, the center of malicious is maintained to reflect the updated
attacks. See Figure 5. 7.
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False
Negative
(dm > dc)

True
Positive

Detection Method 1
Center of
malicious

dm
dc
True
Negative

dm
dc

Center of
Clean

dm : distance from center of malicious
dc : distance from center of clean

False
Positive
(dm < dc )

Malicious code
Clean code

Figure 5. 7: Detection Method 1.

2. Detection Method 2: In this detection method, if the distance from the center of
benign code exceeds a certain threshold ‘h’, the script is assumed to be malicious.
The center of malicious is not used and the system depends wholly on maintaining
a clean code base. See Figure 5. 8.

False
Positive

True
Positive

Center of
Clean

False
Negative

Detection Method 2

True
Negative

Malicious code
Clean code

Threshold
(h)

Figure 5. 8 : Detection Method 2.

The first detection method offers a higher detection performance because it uses both the
center of malicious and center of normal in the detection; while the second method offers
the flexibility of changing the detection threshold and thus balancing the false positives
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and false negatives. This is due to the fact that choosing a bigger threshold from the
center of clean (mean of the clean class) will result in low false positives and high false
negatives and choosing a small threshold from the center of clean will result in high false
positives and low false negative s.
In order to test the performance of the detection, the following performance measures are
used
1. True Positives (TP): number of malicious sources correctly classified as malicious
2. True Negatives (TN): number of benign sources correctly classified as benign
3. False Positives (FP): number of benign sources falsely classified as malicious
4. False Negatives (FN): number of malicious sources falsely classified as benign
5. Detection rate (DR): percentage of number of malicious sources correctly
detected over all malicious sources (TP/(TP+FN))
6. False Positive rate (FPR): percentage of number of benign sources falsely
detected ove r all benign code (FP/(TN+FP))
7. False Negative Rate (FNR): percentage of malicious code sources falsely
undetected over all malicious code (FN/(TP+FN))
8. Overall Accuracy (OA): percentage of number of correctly detected sources (both
benign and malicious) over all available sources (benign and malicious),
(TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN)

5.5.1 Experiment with known data
The first experiment is to use the same data set for training and testing. The following
Table 5. 9 summarizes the results as tested on both detection methods. For the second
detection method, three threshold points were selected in order to illustrate the difference,

Detection

Detection

Detection

Detection

Method 1

Method 2 (h=1)

Method 2 (h=2)

Method 2 (h=3)

FPR

2%

30%

12%

5%

FNR

26%

14%

29%

47%

DR

74%

86%

71%

53%

OA

93%

73%

85%

86%
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Table 5. 9: Summary of experiment with known data

It is clear from the results that by using the center of malicious code, in addition to the
normal profile in detection method 1, the false positive rate is minimized and the overall
system accuracy is improved. So, the false positive rate was 2%, detection rate was 74%,
and overall accuracy was 93%.
In order to illustrate the impact of choosing different threshold points, the following
graph in Figure 5. 9 will show the variation of different key indicators such as false
negative rate, false positive rate, and the overall accuracy against selecting different
thresholds in detection method 2.
IDS performance
100%

System Accuracy
Maximized

Percentage

80%

60%

40%

20%

9.0

8.0

7.0

6.0

5.0

4.0

3.0

2.0

1.0

0.0

0%
Distance (Threshold)
False Negative rate

False Positive Rate

Overall Accuracy

Figure 5. 9 : IDS Performance.

Figure 5. 9 shows that in order to maximize the overall system accuracy, the attack
classifier should be operated at a level of h in the range 1< h< 3. Different operating
points result in different false positive and false negative rates. Increasing h towards the
higher end of the operating range will result in minimizing the false positive rate, while
selecting a low h will result in minimizing the false negative rate.
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Figure 5. 10 depicts the relation between false positive rate and false negative rate in
detection method 2 while varying the threshold 1< h< 3.

False Positive Rate (FPR)

Relation between False Positive Rate and False
Negative Rate

40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

False Negative Rate (FNR)

Figure 5. 10: Relation between False Positive Rate and False Negative in Detection Method 2.

The results of the second detection method (see Table 5. 9) show that at 12% false alarm
rate, the detection rate was 75%. These results were compared with the results of
Cunningham [19] who proposes a neural-network system to classify the nature of the
attack. Although neural networks give better results this is due to the use of various
examples during the learning phase. It was found that in C detector at a similar false
alarm rate, the detection rate achieved was in excess of 90%, while the Shell detector
yielded a detection rate similar to the proposed system 80%.
The results of both the proposed system and the shell detector give approximately similar
results; the reason for this is that script language s are less structured, hence less
predictable, than in structured language such as C.
The following curve in Figure 5. 11 shows the ROC curve (Receiver Operating
Characteristic) [27] which is an aggregate of the probability of false alarms and the
probability of detection measurements. The X axis shows the percentage of detected
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attacks (DR) against the false alarm percentage. It is used to illustrate the results of the
second method of detection applied over the seen data.
Comparing the ROC curve of the proposed system with the ROC curve for the (C
detector, and Shell detector) in Cunningham [19], it was fo und that the ROC curve for the
C detector outperforms both the proposed system and the Shell detector while the ROC
curve for the proposed system is similar to the ROC curve of the Shell detector
ROC Curve
1

Detection Rate

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

False Positive Rate

Figure 5. 11: ROC curve using the second method of detection applied over the seen data

5.5.2 Cross validation over unseen data
The following step is to test the system over 5- folds cross validation test. The purpose of
the test is to highlight the impact of using the system in a real- life scenario, where the
incoming data to the classifier will be unseen, and the normal profile (as well as the
malicious center) is pre-calculated over a fixed set of data.

The experiment studies the impact of training the system over 80% of the original data
set. The outcome of training is to calculate a new mean (center for both the clean and the
malicious code) and then to use the new calculated profiles to test the incoming data.

The following Table 5. 10 summarizes the results tested by the system for the 5 folds
cross validation. It is evident from the results that the average indicators (False Positive
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Rate, False Negative Rate, Overall Accuracy, and Detection Rate) don’t deviate
significantly from the first experiment over seen data; it is consistent as well with the
previous experiment. The second method of detection (based only on a threshold) still
shows less attractive results in comparison to the first detection method. The first
detection method offers a higher detection rate because it uses the center of malicious
during the classification. Thus, a script can be easily classified as a malicious or normal
depending on its distance from the center of benign and the center of malicious codes.

Detection Method 1
FPR
FNR
DR
OA
Detection Method 2
h=1
FPR
FNR
DR
OA
h=2
FPR
FNR
DR
OA
h=3
FPR
FNR
DR
OA

Fold 1
3%
25%
75%
93%
Fold 1
30%
14%
86%
73%
12%
29%
71%
85%
5%
47%
53%
86%

Fold 2
3%
21%
79%
93%
Fold 2
30%
14%
86%
73%
12%
29%
71%
85%
5%
47%
53%
86%

Fold 3
3%
22%
78%
93%
Fold 3
30%
14%
86%
73%
12%
29%
71%
85%
5%
47%
53%
86%

Fold 4
3%
25%
75%
92%
Fold 4
28%
14%
86%
75%
12%
31%
69%
85%
4%
58%
42%
85%

Fold 5
2%
25%
75%
93%
Fold 5
28%
14%
86%
75%
11%
29%
71%
85%
5%
47%
53%
87%

5 folds

Detection

Detection

Detection

Detection

Average

Method 1

Method 2 (h =1)

Method 2 (h =2)

Method 2 (h =3)

FPR

3%

29%

11%

5%

FNR

24%

14%

29%

49%

DR

76%

86%

71%

51%

OA

93%

74%

85%

86%

Table 5. 10: Summary of cross validation results.
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The following graph in Figure 5. 12 shows the ROC curve for the 5 folds cross
validation. It is noticed also that the curve is largely similar to the ROC curve generated
from the experiment over known data.
ROC Curve
100%

DR (%)

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

FPR (%)

Figure 5. 12: ROC Curve for the 5 folds Cross Validation.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work

6.1 Research Summary
The need for dynamic content, feature-rich Web sites has lead to the adoption of various
scripting languages. JavaScript, and VBScript are perhaps two of the commonly used
ones nowadays. Designed with flexibility in mind, the adoption of these technologies
within popular Internet applications and operating systems has led to the widespread
problem of viruses, Trojan horses, worms, and script attacks.
Web Script codes are transmitted as source codes over the Internet and are automatically
executed on any target machine. Accordingly they are hardware independent. This feature
is among other features of VBScripts that make it receiving increasing focus as a
backdoor for attacking computers by threatening the user’s computer through sending
itself in e- mail attachment or through browsing an infected site. What also led to the
widespread of malicious attacks in VBScript is that malicious script can restrict its
activity to unnoticeable levels by changing the windows registry, causing loss of data,
and then spreading itself to infect other systems.
Commercial virus scanners are the first line of defense that protect against these malicious
mobile codes. They can effectively detect known attacks, but are not able to effectively
detect new types of attacks. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) fill this role and usually
form the last line of defense against any kinds of attacks. They are useful not only in
detecting successful break- ins, but also in monitoring attempts to breach security.
The thesis presented the use of Anomaly host based IDS to limit the damages caused by
malicious VBScript attacks. It is based on two main assumptions: the majority of
malicious codes exhibit different behaviors in comparison to normal codes, at the same
time the codes within each group share common patterns. The code patterns exhibited in
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malicious VBScripts are unique to attack codes and record very low presence in normal
VBScripts. The results reached in the thesis have proved both hypotheses.
The proposed anomaly host based IDS uses Principal Component Analysis (PCA), a
multivariate statistical technique, that identifies patterns in script codes by highlighting
their similarities and differences. Getting relations in this problem that combine a group
of VBScript features is computationally expensive and are hard to find. PCA is used to
reduce the dimensionality of data in which a large number of variables (243 elements) are
interrelated. PCA accomplishes this by computing a smaller set (20 Principal
Components) of uncorrelated variables which best represent the original data. Therefore,
it can easily detect VBScripts with malicious behavior and allow for normal scripts to
bypass.
A working implementation has been developed and tested against real viruses (malicious
VBScripts) collected from various sources. Two types of experiments were used to train
and test the system: experiment over known VBScript and experiment over unseen
VBScript (5 fold cross validation). The testing carried over the developed system showed
that the proposed scheme has a good detection rate with low false alarms. The first
detection method over seen and unseen data shows that the use of the center of malicious
plays an important role in enhancing the overall system accuracy to (94%). However, the
limitation of the first detection method is the 26% high rate of false negative s.
The second detection method offers the flexibility of using different threshold points and
thus, balancing the false positives and false negatives. The system delivers a good job in
detecting VBScript attacks. It has 10% false positive, 29% false negative, and 75%
detection rate. Comparing these results with the results of Cunningham

[19] who

proposes a neural- network system to classify the attacks (developed in C and Unix Shell
Scripts), it was found that VBScripts are more difficult to accurately classify than attacks
developed in more structured languages (e.g. C). The C detector has 10% false alarms
and 98% detection rate. On the other hand, the proposed system yields similar results
when compared to Unix Shell detector, it has 80% detection rate.
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Finally, the system is robust; it performed well in training and detection. Training the
system has a complexity of O (n2 ) which is the complexity of matrix conversion. While
the system detection which is based on Euclidean distance (a simple distance measure)
uses a small feature vectors (20 principal components) in detection. Thus, it doesn’t have
a bad impact on system performance and computing resources. Both detection me thod 1
and detection method 2 performed well, they have a complexity of O ( n).

6.2 Contributions
The main contribution in this thesis is proposing an extension on Cunningham’s work
[19] through the detection of source codes of attacks from malicious VBScripts. Script
coding such as VBScripts dominate the vast majority of internet script utilization;
however, the literature available to present did not sufficiently address the problem of
malicious VBScripts as a backdoor of attacking many computers. Thus, using an anomaly
host based IDS that limits the damage caused by malicious VBScripts addresses a serious
research gap. One of the key benefits of the introduced IDS is that it is not signaturebased, therefore it handles a class of malicious codes, and active scripting based attacks
rather than specific instances. As a result, it addresses both future and unknown active
scripting attacks.
The use of Principal Component Analysis (a Multivariate statistical technique) for
extracting benign profile also proved advantageous. First, it does not have any
distributional assumption compared to other statistical based intrusion detection methods
which usually assume a normal distribution profile. Secondly, it is typical for the data of
this problem to be high dimensional. Hence, in the proposed scheme, robust PCA is
applied to reduce the dimensionality in order to build a classifier that depends only on the
principal components. PCA reduces the dimension of the data without sacrificing its
valuable information. Only a few parameters of principal components need to be retained
for future detection.
Finally, the proposed classifier is based on a simple distance instead of using Neural
Networks (NNs) in classification as followed by Cunningham. The proposed scheme is
based on Euclidean distance and thus it is direct and simple. Its advantageous nature
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comes from the minimum time it takes to classify. The mean class values are used as
class centers; a script is classified as belonging to malicio us class, if the distance from
benign profile is beyond a certain threshold that can be changed to optimize the operation
of the classifier.

6.3 Future work
Future work based on this thesis could be divided into various directions:
1. A key benefit of the proposed system is its low false positive rate of 2% in detection
method 1, a misuse IDS system on the other hand usually delivers a low false
negative rate. Signature-based systems can identify previously unseen attacks that are
abstractly equivalent to known patterns. As they are inherently unable to detect truly
novel attacks and suffer from false positive rates. So the primary strength of anomaly
detection is its ability to recognize novel attacks. The main drawback though is the
difficulty of tracking natural changes; these changes can cause false alarms, while
intrusive activities that appear to be normal can cause missed detection. Thus, the
introduced IDS can benefit from the advantages of both techniques. Using a
combined misuse and anomaly detection will tackle the drawback in each technique.
So the introduced IDS could easily detect previous attacks as well as new and unseen
ones with low rate of false alarms.

2. Increasing the size of the proposed problem by using more examples of VBScript
attacks and dividing the malicious class into several classes such as changing a
registry, infection, replication classes. Then, PCA will be applied as a classifier to
determine which type of attacks has performed in order to prevent further attacks.

3. Test the use of PCA as a classifier (instead of neural networks) when applied on
Cunningham’s proposed work [19] and compare its results with the proposed system.

4. The use of PCA as a classifier was chosen based on its simplicity in classification.
Other methods of classification that uses different distance metrics, as well as
different detection techniques (e.g. neural networks) can be tested to check its impact
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on the system’s results. There might be a tradeoff between speed of classification and
system accuracy.

5. Although VBScript is one of the most widespread scripting languages on the web,
other language (e.g., Java) and scripting language (e.g. JavaScript) are still in use and
do present significant security holes. The proposed system can be extended by adding
different language specific feature extraction.
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Appendix A
Parser

#include "Ftest4.h"
/*****************************************************/
char

Elements[MAXELEMENTS][MAXLINELEN];

int

ElementsRepetition[MAXELEMENTS][MAXFILES];

int

ElementsOccuranceFlag[MAXELEMENTS][MAXFILES];

float

CumulativePercentOccurance[MAXELEMENTS];

float

Correlation[MAXELEMENTS][MAXELEMENTS];

int

LineEvaluate(char *virline,char *elementline);

int

numfiles=0,numelements=0;

/*****************************************************
Program Steps
------------1) Open the feature file
2) Create the output file for the analysis
3) Read the elements of the feature
4) Fill the 'ElementsRepetition' matrix
5) Fill the 'Ele mentsOccuranceFlag' matrix
6) Fill the 'CumulativePercentOccurance' matrix
7) Fill the 'Correlation' matrix
8) Write output file
*****************************************************/
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
FILE
struct ffblk
int

*infile,*outfile,*virfile;
filesearchresult;
filesearchflag;
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int

i,j,repeatnum;

char

buffer[MAXLINELEN];

char

*LineElement;

char

CompleteFileName[MAXLINELEN];

int

UptoElementsOccurance[MAXFILES];

float
UptoElementsPercentOccurance[MAXELEMENTS];

LineElement = malloc(MAXLINELEN*sizeof(char));
memset(UptoElementsOccurance,0,MAXFILES*sizeof(int));
memset(UptoElementsPercentOccurance,0,MAXELEMENTS*sizeof(float));

memset(ElementsRepetition,0,MAXELEMENTS*MAXFILES*sizeof(int));
memset(CumulativePercentOccurance,0,MAXELEMENTS*sizeof(float));

if(argc != 4)
{
printf("\nLooks for the feature in 'in' file then writes \
the analysis in 'out'");
printf("\nover the VBS files in directory 'dir'");
printf("\nFormat : FTEST in out dir \n");
return 0;
}

// 1 - Open the feature file
if ((infile = fopen(argv[1], "rt")) == NULL)
{
printf("\nCan't open input file %s. Press any key to exit \n",argv[1]);
return 1;
}
////////////////////////////////////////////////////

98

// 2 - Create the output file for the analysis
if ((outfile = fopen(argv[2], "wt")) == NULL)
{
printf("\nCannot open output file %s. Press any key to exit\n",argv[2]);
return 1;
}
////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// 3 - Read the elements of the feature
while(!feof(infile))
{
fgets(Elements[numelements],MAXLINELEN,infile);

// if the string is too short, do not count
if(strlen(Elements[numelements])>1)
{
// eliminate last character being '\n'
if(Elements[numelements][strlen(Elements[numelements])-1] == '\n')
Elements[numelements][strlen(Elements[numelements])-1]
= 0;
StrtoLower(Elements[numelements]);
numelements++;
}

if(numelements == MAXELEMENTS)
{
printf("\nMAX number of elements exceeded (%i).\
Press any key to terminate\n",MAXELEMENTS);
getch();
return 1;
}
}
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////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// 4 - Fill the 'ElementsRepetition' matrix
sprintf(CompleteFileName,"%s%s",argv[3],"\\*.vbs");
filesearchflag =

findfirst(CompleteFileName,&filesearchresult,0);

while(!filesearchflag)
{

sprintf(CompleteFileName,"%s%s%s",argv[3],"\\",filesearchresult.ff_name);

if ((virfile = fopen(CompleteFileName,"r")) == NULL)
{
printf("\nCannot open file %s. Press any key to\
exit\n",filesearchresult.ff_name);
getch();
fclose(infile);
fclose(outfile);
fclose(virfile);
return 1;
}

while(!feof(virfile))
{
memset(buffer,0,MAXLINELEN*sizeof(char));
if(fgets(buffer,MAXLINELEN,virfile) == NULL)
break;

StrtoLower(buffer);

for (i=0;i<numeleme nts;i++)
ElementsRepetition[i][numfiles]+= LineEvaluate(buffer,Elements[i]);
}
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fclose(virfile);

numfiles++;
if(numfiles == MAXFILE)
{
printf("\nMAX number of files exceeded (%i). Press any key to \
exit\n",MAXFILES);
getch();
fclose(infile);
fclose(outfile);
fclose(virfile);
return 1;
}

sprintf(CompleteFileName,"%s%s",argv[3],"\\*.vbs");
filesearchflag =

findnext(&filesearchresult);

}
////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// 5 - Fill the 'ElementsOccuranceFlag' matrix
for(i=0;i<numelements;i++)
for(j=0;j<numfiles;j++)
if(ElementsRepetition[i][j])
ElementsOccuranceFlag[i][j]=1;
////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// 6) Fill the 'UptoElementsPercentOccurance' &
//

'CumulativePercentOccurance' matrix

for(j=0;j<numfiles;j++)
for(i=0;i<numelements;i++)
if(ElementsRepetition[i][j])
UptoElementsOccurance[j]++;
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for(j=0;j<numfiles;j++)
UptoElementsPercentOccurance[UptoElementsOccurance[j]-1]++;

for(i=0;i<numelements;i++)

UptoElementsPercentOccurance[i]=UptoElementsPercentOccurance[i]/numfiles;

for(i=0;i<numelements;i++)
for(j=numelements-1;j>=i;j--)
CumulativePercentOccurance[i]+=UptoElementsPercentOccurance[j];

////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// 7 - Fill the 'Correlation' matrix
for(i=0;i<numelements;i++)
for(j=i;j<numelements;j++)
Correlation[i][j] = Correlate(ElementsOccuranceFlag[i],
ElementsOccuranceFlag[j],numfiles);
////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// 8 - Write output file
fprintf(outfile,"\n");
fprintf(outfile,"[Analysis Information]\n");
fprintf(outfile,"======================\n");
fprintf(outfile,"Directory of test files : %s\n",argv[3]);
fprintf(outfile,"Number of files tested : %i\n",numfiles);
fprintf(outfile,"\n\n");

fprintf(outfile,"Feature file name
fprintf(outfile,"Number of Elements

: %s\n",argv[1]);
: %i\n",numelements);

fprintf(outfile,"\n\n\n");
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fprintf(outfile,"[Elements list]\n");
fprintf(outfile,"===============\n");
fprintf(outfile,"

%-60s Repetition

Occurance\n","Element");

fprintf(outfile,"

%-60s ---------- ---------\n","-------");

for(i=0;i<numelements;i++)
{
fprintf(outfile,"%c - '%-60s'

",'a'+i,StrtoLower(Elements[i]));

for(repeatnum=0,j=0;j<numfiles;j++)
repeatnum += ElementsRepetition[i][j];
fprintf(outfile,"%3i

",repeatnum);

for(repeatnum=0,j=0;j<numfiles;j++)
repeatnum += ElementsOccuranceFlag[i][j];
fprintf(outfile,"%3i\n",repeatnum);
}
fprintf(outfile,"\n\n\n");

fprintf(outfile,"[Elements Correlation]\n");
fprintf(outfile,"======================\n");

fprintf(outfile,"

");

for(i=0;i<numelements;i++)
fprintf(outfile," %c

",'a'+i);

fprintf(outfile,"\n");

fprintf(outfile," ");
for(i=0;i<numelements;i++)
fprintf(outfile," --- ");
fprintf(outfile,"\n");
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for(i=0;i<numelements;i++)
{
fprintf(outfile,"%c : ",'a'+i);
for(j=0;j<numelements;j++)
{
if(j>=i)
fprintf(outfile,"%+2.2f ",Correlation[i][j]);
else
fprintf(outfile,"

");

}
fprintf(outfile,"\n");
}
fprintf(outfile,"\n\n\n");

fprintf(outfile,"[Distribution of Elements Occurance]\n");
fprintf(outfile,"====================================\n");
fprintf(outfile,"%% of feature hit
fprintf(outfile,"----------------

%% of code population\n");

--------------------\n");

for(i=0;i<numelements;i++)
fprintf(outfile,"

%05.1f%%

%05.1f%%\n",

(float)(100*(i+1)/numelements),100*CumulativePercentOccurance[i]);
////////////////////////////////////////////////////

fclose(infile);
fclose(outfile);
fclose(virfile);

return 0;
}

104

/*****************************************************/
char

*StrtoLower(char

*str)

{
int

i=0;

while(str[i]!=0)
str[i++] = (char)tolower(str[i]);
return str;
}
/*****************************************************/
float

Correlate(int *array1,int

*array2,int len)

{
float

mean1=0.0,mean2=0.0;

float

numerator=0.0,denom1=0.0,denom2=0.0;

int

i;

for(i=0;i<len;i++)
{
mean1 += array1[i];
mean2 += array2[i];
}

mean1 = mean1/len;
mean2 = mean2/len;

for(i=0;i<len;i++)
numerator += (array1[i]- mean1)*(array2[i]- mean2);

for(i=0;i<len;i++)
{
denom1 += pow(array1[i],2);
denom2 += pow(array2[i],2);

105

}

denom1 -= len*pow(mean1,2);
denom2 -= len*pow(mean2,2);

if(denom1 == 0)
return -9.99;

if(denom2 == 0)
return -9.99;

return(numerator/sqrt(denom1*denom2));
}
/*****************************************************/
char

*TrimSpaces(char

*str)

{
char

*output = str;

while((str[strlen(str)-1] == ' ') || (str[strlen(str)-1] == '\t'))
str[strlen(str)-1] = 0;

while((output[0] == ' ') || (output[0] == '\t'))
output ++;

strcpy(str,output);
return str;
}
/*****************************************************/
int

LineEvaluate(char *virline,char *elementline)

{
unsigned
int

int

i=0;
j=0,k=0;
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char

subelement[MAXLINELEN] ="";

char

substline[MAXLINELEN] ="";

while(i < strlen(elementline))
{
if(eleme ntline[i] == '\"')
{
j=0;
i++;
do
{
subelement[j] = elementline[i];
i++;
j++;
}
while(elementline[i] != '\"');

subelement[j] = '\0';
substline[k] = (strstr(StrtoLower(virline),
StrtoLower(subelement)) == NULL) ? '0' : '1';
}
else
substline[k] = elementline[i];

i++;
k++;
}

return(val(substline));
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}
/*****************************************************/
int

val(char

*expression)

{
unsigned

int

i;

int

operation;

char arg1[MAXLEN]="";
char arg2[MAXLEN]="";

// Removes dummy parentheses , if any .
RemoveParentheses(expression);

// If expression = number , return number , else proceed
for(i=0;i<strlen(expression)-1;i++)
if( (isdigit(expression[i])==0) && (expression[i]!='.') )
break;

if( i==(strlen(expression)-1) )
return(atof(expression));

if( (operation =

GetLevel(expression,arg1,arg2,1)) == -1 )

if( (operation = GetLevel(expression,arg1,arg2,2)) == -1 )
operation = GetLevel(expression,arg1,arg2,3);

RemoveParentheses(arg1);
RemoveParentheses(arg2);

switch(operation)
{
case

OR

:

return(val(arg1) || val(arg2));
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case

AND :

return(val(arg1) && val(arg2));

}
}
/*****************************************************/
char

*RemoveParentheses(char

*input)

{
int

OpenParentheses=0;

unsigned

int

i,length_1=strlen(input)-1;

if( (input[0]!='(') || (input[length_1]!=')') )
return(input);

for(i=0;i<length_1;i++)
{
switch(input[i])
{
case

'('

:

OpenParentheses++; break;

case

')'

:

OpenParentheses--; break;

}
if( OpenParentheses==0 )
return(input);
}
input[length_1]=0;
strcpy(input,&input[1]);

if( (input[0] =='(') && (input[strlen(input)-1] ==')') )
return(RemoveParentheses(input));
else
return(input);
}
/*****************************************************/
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int GetLevel(char *expression,char *arg1,char *arg2,int

level)

{
int

LevelOfParenthese=0;

char

x[MAXLEN]="";

char

C1='\0';

unsigned

int

i;

unsigned

short

int

OP1;

case

1

:

C1='+' ; OP1=OR ; break;

case

2

:

C1='*' ; OP1=AND ; break;

switch(level)
{

}

for(i=0;i<strlen(expression);i++)
{
LevelOfParenthese += (expression[i] == '(')? 1:0;
LevelOfParenthese -= (expression[ i] == ')')? 1:0;

if((expression[i] == C1)&&(LevelOfParenthese==0))
{
strncpy(x,expression,i*sizeof(char));
strcpy(arg1,x);
strcpy(x,&expression[i+1]);
strcpy(arg2,x);
return(OP1);
}
}
return(-1);
}
/*****************************************************/
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Appendix B
Mathematical Background
This appendix first introduces mathematical concepts that will be used in Principal
Component Analysis (PCA). It covers standard deviation, covariance, eigenvectors
and eigenvalues. It is divided into two parts. The first section focuses on Statistics
which looks at distribution measurements, or, how the data is spread out. The
second section describes Matrix Algebra and looks at eigenvectors and eigenvalues,
important properties of matrices that are fundamental to PCA.

1. Statistics
The entire subject of statistics is based around the idea that given a big set of data,
and we want to analyze that set in terms of the relationships between the individual
points in that data set. We are going to look at a few of the measures we can do on a
set of data, and what they tell about the data itself.
1.1 Standard Deviation
To understand standard deviation, we need a data set. Statisticians are usually
concerned with taking a sample of a population. To use election polls as an
example, the population is all the people in the country, whereas a sample is a
subset of the population that the statisticians measure. The great thing about
statistics is that by only measuring a sample of the population, we can work out
what is most likely to be the measurement if the entire population is used. In this
statistics section, we are going to assume that our data sets are samples of some
bigger population.
Here’s an example set:

X = [1 2 4 6 12 15 25 45 68 67 65 98]
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The symbol X is used to refer to this entire set of numbers. If we want to refer to an
individual number in this data set, we will use subscripts on the symbol X to
indicate a specific number in this data set to indicate a specific number. Eg. X3
refers to the 3rd number in X, namely the number 4. Note that X1 is the first number
in the sequence. Also, the symbol n will be used to refer to the number of elements
in the set X. There are number of things that we can calculate about a data set. For
example, we can calculate the mean of the sample.

X = ∑i=1
n

Xi
n

The symbol X indicates the mean of the set X . This formula adds up all the
numbers and then divide by how many they are.
Unfortunately, the mean doesn’t tell a lot about the data except for a sort of middle
point. For example, these two data sets have exactly the same mean 10, but are
obviously quite different.

[0 8 12 20] and [8 9 11 12]

So what is different about these two sets? It is the spread of the data that is different.
The Standard Deviation (SD) of a data set is a measure of how spread out the data
is. The definition of SD is the average distance from the mean of the data set to a
point. The way to calculate it is to compute the squares of the distance from each
data point to the mean of the set, add them all up, divide by n-1 and take the
positive square root. As a formula:
n

s=

∑( X
i =1

i

− X )2

(n − 1)

Where S is the usual symbol for standard deviation of a sample.
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1.2 Variance:
Variance is another measure of the spread of data in a data set. In fact it is almost
identical to standard deviation. The formula is this:

∑
=

n

s

2

i =1

( X I − X )2
(n − 1)

You will notice that this is simply the standard deviation squared; S2 is the usual
symbol for variance of a sample. Both these measurements are measures of the
spread of the data.
1.3 Covariance

The previous two measures are purely 1-dimensional. However many data sets
have more than one dimension, and the aim of the statistical analysis of these data
sets is usually to see if there is any relationship between the dimensions. For
example, we might have a data set for both the height of all the students in a class,
and the mark they received for that paper. Statistical analysis is performed to see if
the height of a student has any effect on their mark. Standard deviation and variance
only operate on 1 dimension, so that we could only calculate the standard deviation
for each dimension of the data set independently of the other dimensions. However,
it is useful to have a similar measure to find out how much the dimensions vary
from the mean with respect to each other. Covariance is such a measure.
Covariance is always measured between 2 dimensions. If we calculate the
covariance between one dimension and itself, you get the variance. So if we had a 3
dimensional data set (x, y, z) then we could measure the covariance between the x
and y dimensions, the x and z dimensions, and the y and z dimensions. Measuring
the covariance between x and x, or y and y, or z and z would give the variance of
the x, y, and z dimensions respectively.
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The formula for covariance is very similar to the formula for variance. The formula
for variance is written like this:

∑
var( X ) =

n
i =1

( X i − X )( X i − X )
(n − 1)

The formula for covariance

∑
COV ( X , Y ) =

n
i =1

( X i − X )(Yi − Y )
( n − 1)

It is exactly the same except that in the second set of brackets, the X’s are replaced
by Y’s. “For each data item, multiplying the difference between the x value and the
mean of x x, by the difference between the y value and the mean of y = Add all
these up, and divide by (n-1).
The exact value is not as important as its sign (ie. Positive or negative). If the value
is positive, as it is here, then that indicates that both dimensions increase together,
meaning that, in general, as the number of hours of study increased, so did the final
mark. If the value is negative, then as one dimension increases, the other decreases.
If we had ended up with a negative covariance here, then that would have said the
opposite that as the number of hours of study increased the final mark decreased. In
the last case, if the covariance is zero, it indicates that the two dimensions are
independent of each other.
COV(X,Y) is equal to COV(Y,X), this means that they are exactly the same since
the only difference between COV(X,Y) and COV(Y,X) is that ( X i − X )(Yi − Y ) is
replaced by (Yi − Y )( X i − X ) .

1.4 The covariance Matrix

Covariance is always measured between 2 dimensions. If we have a data set with
more than 2 dimensions, there is more than one covariance measurement that can be
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calculated. For example, in a 3 dimensional data set (dimensions x, y, z), we could
calculate COV(X,Y), COV(X,Z), COV(Y,Z).
A useful way to get all the possible covariance values between all the different
dimensions is to calculate them all and put them in a matrix. So, the definition of
the covariance matrix for a set of data with dimensions is:

C m×n = (c i, j , c i, j = COV(Dim i , Dim J ))
Where C m×n is a matrix with n rows and n columns, and Dimx is the xth dimension.
The following is an example of the covariance matrix for an imaginary 3
dimensional data set, using the usual dimensions x, y, and z. Then, the covariance
matrix has 3 rows and 3 columns, and the values are this:
 cov (x , x ) cov (x , y ) cov (x , z ) 


C =  cov( y, x ) cov( y, y ) cov( y, z ) 
 cov (x , x ) cov( z, y ) cov( z, z ) 



Down the main diagonal, the covariance value is between one of the dimensions
and itself. These are the variances for that dimension. The other point is that since
cov( a, b ) = cov( b, a) the matrix is symmetrical about the main diagonal.

2. Matrix Algebra
This section provides a background on the matrix algebra required in PCA.
Specifically it focuses on eigenvectors and eigenvalues of a given matrix.
2.1 Eigenvectors
You can multiply two matrices together, provided they are compatible sizes.
Eigenvectors are a special case of this. Consider the two multiplications between a
matrix and a vector in the following examples

 2 3  1  11


 2 1  ×  3  =  5 
    

Example of non-eigenvector
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 2 3  3  12 
3

 ×   =   = 4 ×  

 2 1  2  8 
2




Example of eigenvector

In the first example, the resulting vector is not an integer multiple of the original
vector, whereas in the second example, it is exactly 4 times the vector we began

 3
with. The vector is a vector in a 2 dimensional space. The vector   (from the
 2
second example multiplication) represents an arrow pointing from the origin (0,0) to
the point (3,2).The other matrix, the square one, can be thought of as a
transformation matrix. If we multiply this matrix on the left of a vector, the answer
is another vector that is transformed from its original position.
It is the nature of the transformation that the eigenvectors arise from. Imagine a
transformation matrix that, when multiplied on the left, reflected vectors in the line
y = x. Then we can see that if there were a vector that la y on the line y = x, it’s a
reflection itself. This vector and all multiples of it would be an eigenvector of that
transformation matrix.

The properties of these eigenvectors are:
1. Eigenvectors can only be found for square matrices. And, not every square
matrix has eigenvectors. And, given an n × n matrix that does have
eigenvectors, there are n of them. Given a 3 × 3 matrix, there are 3 eigenvectors.

2. Another property of eigenvectors is that even if we scale the vector by some
amount before we multiply it, we still get the same multiple of it as a result, as
in the following example:
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 3   6
2 ×   =  
2 4



 2 3   6   24 
 6

 ×   =   = 4 ×  
 2 1   4   16 
 4


Examples of how a scaled eigenvector is still an eigenvector.

This is because if we scale a vector by some amount, all you are doing is making it
longer, not changing it’s direction.

3. Lastly, all the eigenvectors of a matrix are perpendicular, ie. at right angles to
each other, no matter how many dimensions we have. Another word for
perpendicular, in math talk, is orthogonal. This is important because it means
that we can express the data in terms of these perpendicular eigenvectors instead
of expressing them in terms of the x and y axes.

Another important thing is that when mathematicians find eigenvectors, they like to
find the eigenvectors whose length is exactly one. This is because the length of a
vector doesn’t affect whether it’s an eigenvector or not, whereas the direction does.
So, in order to keep eigenvectors standard, whenever we find an eigenvector we
usually scale it to make it have a length of 1, so that all eigenvectors have the same
length. Here’s a demonstration in the example above.

 3
 
 2

is an eigenvector, and the length of that vector is

(3 2 + 2 2 ) = 13
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So we divide the original vector by this much to make it have a length of 1.

 3



 3
13

  ÷ 13 = 

2
 2


13 


2.2 Eigenvalues
Eigenvalues are closely related to eigenvectors, in fact, we saw an eigenvalue like
in the following example:
 2 3  3  12 
3

 ×   =   = 4 ×  

 2 1  2  8 
2




The amount by which the original vector was scaled after multiplication by the
square matrix was the same? In that example, the value was 4. The eigenvalue is 4
associated with that eigenvector. No matter what multiple of the eigenvector we
took before we multiplied it by the square matrix, we would always get 4 times the
scaled vector. So we can see that eigenvectors and eigenvalues always come in
pairs.
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Appendix C
Principal Components Analysis

This appendix is designed to give an understanding of the process of Principal
Component Analysis (PCA). PCA is a useful technique that has found application in
fields such as face recognition and image compression, and is a common technique for
finding patterns in data of high dimension.
Principal Component s Analysis (PCA) is a way of identifying patterns in data, and
expressing the data in such a way to highlight their similarities and differences. Since
patterns are hard to find in data of high dimension, where the luxury of graphical
representation is not available, PCA is a powerful tool for analyzing data. The other main
advantage of PCA is that once these patterns were found in the data; we can compress the
data by reducing the number of dimensions, without much loss of information. The
following section will explain the steps needed to perform PCA on a set of data.

1. Method
Step 1: Subtracting the mean
For PCA to work properly, we have to subtract the mean from each of the data
dimensions. The mean subtracted is the average across each dimension. So, all the x
values have x (the mean of the x values of all the data points) subtracted, and all the y
values have y subtracted from them. This produces a data set whose mean is zero, See
Table 1 and Figure 1.
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PCA example data, original data
Data
x

y

2.5

2.4

0.5

0.7

2.2

2.9

1.9

2.2

3.1

3.0

2.3

2.7

2

1.6

1

1.1

1.5

1.6

1.1

0.9

Data with the means subtracted
Data Adjust
x

y

0.69

0.49

-1.31

-1.21

0.39

0.99

0.09

0.29

1.29

1.09

0.49

0.79

0.19

-0.31

-0.81

-0.81

-0.31

-0.31

-0.71

-1.01

Table 1: PCA example data, original data and data with the means subtracted.
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Original PCA data
4

+

3
+
+
+

+

2
+

1

+

+
+

+

0

0

1

2

3

4

Figure1: Plot of the original data
Step 2: Calculating the covariance matrix
This is done exactly the same way as was discussed earlier. Since the data is 2
dimensional, the covariance matrix will be 2 × 2.

 0.616555556 0.615444444 

COV = 

0
.
615444444
0
.
716555556



So, since the non-diagonal elements in this covariance matrix are positive, we should
expect that both the X and Y variable increase together.

Step 3: Calculating the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
Since the covariance matrix is square, we can calculate the eigenvectors and eigenvalues
for this matrix. Here are the eigenvectors and eigenvalues.
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 0.490833989 
eigenvalues = 

 1.28402771 

 − 0.735178656 − 0.677873399 

eigenvectors = 
 0.677873399 − 0.735178656 
It is important to notice that these eigenvectors are both unit eigenvectors ie. their lengths
are both 1. The data has quite a strong pattern. As expected from the covariance matrix,
the two variables do indeed increase together. On top of the data, the eigenvectors were
plotted. They appear as diagonal dotted lines on the plot. As stated in the eigenvector
section, they are perpendicular to each other. They provide information about the patterns
in the data. The eigenvectors go through the middle of the points, like drawing a line of
best fit. That eigenvector shows how these two data sets are related along that line. The
second eigenvector gives the other, less important, pattern in the data, that all the points
follow the main line, but are off to the side of the main line by some amount.
So, by this process of taking the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix, we have been able
to extract lines that characterize the data. The rest of the steps involve transforming the
data so that it is expressed in terms of lines, See Figure 2.
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Mean adjusted data with eigenvectors overlaid
2
1.5
+
+

1

+
+

0.5
+

0
+

+

-0.5
+
+

-1
+

-1.5
-2
-2

-1.5

1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

Figure2: A plot of the normalized data (mean subtracted) with the
eigenvectors of the covariance matrix overlaid on top.

Step 4: Choosing components and forming a feature vector
Here is where the notion of data compression and reduced dimensionality comes
into it. If we look at the eigenvectors and eigenvalues from the previous section, we
will notice that the eigenvalues are quite different values. In fact, it turns out that
the eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue is the principle component of the data
set.
In our example, the eigenvector with the largest eigenvalue was the one that pointed
down the middle of the data. It is the most significant relationship between the data
dimensions.
In general, once eigenvectors are found from the covariance matrix, the next step is
to order them by eigenvalue, highest to lowest. This gives you the components in
order of significance. Now, if you like, you can decide to ignore the components of
lesser significance. You do lose some information, but if the eigenvalues are small,
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you don’t lose much. If you leave out some components, the final data set will have
less dimensions than the original, see Table 2 and Figure 3.
To be precise, if you originally have n dimensions in your data, and so you calculate
n eigenvectors and eigenvalues, and then you choose only the first P eigenvectors,
then the final data set has only P dimensions. What needs to be done now is you
need to form a feature vector for a matrix of vectors. This is constructed by taking
the eigenvectors that you want to keep from the list of eigenvectors, and forming a
matrix with these eigenvectors in the columns.
FeatureVector = (eig1 eig2 eig3 …………..eign )
Given our example set of data, and the fact that we have 2 eigenvectors, we have
two choices. We can either form a feature vector with both of the eigenvectors.

 − 0.677873399 − 0.735178656 

 − 0.735178656 0.677873399 



or, we can choose to leave out the smaller, less significant component and only have
a single column.
 − 0.677873399 


 − 0.735178656 
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Transformed Data
x

y

-0.827970186

-0.175115307

1.77758033

0.142857227

-0.992197494

0.384374989

-0.274210416

-0.209498461

-0.167580142

0.175282444

0.991094375

-0.349824698

1.14457276

-0.349824698

0.438046137

0.177646297

1.22382056

-0.162675287

Table2: Data transformed with 2 eigenvectors

2
1.5
1
0.5
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+

+
+

0

+

+
+

+

-0.5

+

+

-1
-1.5
-2
-2

-1.5

1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

Figure 3:The table of data by applying the PCA analysis using both eigenvectors,
and a plot of the new data points.
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Appendix D

Malicious VBScript
VBS1.vbs
VBS.TripleSix.vbs
I-Worm.Fiume.vbs
IIS -Worm.IISWorm.vbs
Script.ASX.Conp.vbs
Wordsworth.vbs
IRC-Worm.Wordsworth.vbs
VBS.Monopoly.VBS
MONOPOLY.VBS
VBS.Nomek.vbs
JS.Judge.vbs
VBS.Monopoly.b.VBS
VBS.Monopoly.c.vbs
Monopoly.c.vbs
LovingYou.vbs
VBS.Devolve.vbs
virus.vbs
VBS.Hard.vbs
Hard.vbs
Winvader.vbs
VBS.Charm.vbs
Zulud.vbs
VBS.Zulu.d.vbs
Zulu.d.vbs
VBS.Zuluc.vbs
VBS.Zulu.c.vbs
Alcau.vbs
Zulu.c.vbs
virus8.vbs
Euro2002.vbs
VBS.Trojan.Toren.vbs
Script.BRB.vbs
I-Worm.LoveLetter.VBS
I-A93F~1.VBS
Redlof.vbs
Trip.vbs
VBS.Zulub.vbs
VBS.Zulu.b.VBS
I-Worm.WinXP.vbs
I-Worm.Croatia.vbs
VBS.Casel.vbs
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VBS3.vbs
Zulu.b.vbs
I-Worm.Avalon.vbs
VBS.Missy.VBS
missy.vbs
IRC-Worm.Missy.VBS
Britney.vbs
VBS.Trojan.Noob.vbs
VBS.Tunef.vbs
VBS.LoveLetter.A.vbs
VBS.Charlene.vbs
deepblue001.vbs
VBS.Freelink.vbs
I-Worm.Lee.VBS
IIS -Worm.CodeGreen.vbs
Zulu.vbs
VBS.Zulu.VBS
VBS.Phram.b.VBS
VBS.Sant.vbs
Sant.vbs
VBS.Phram.vbs
Phram.vbs
VBS.Chango.vbs
VBS.Saje.vbs
VBS.Mbop.d.vbs
Mbop!-Vbs.vbs
VBS.Enc.vbs
ZELDA.VBS
VBS.Tune.i.vbs
VBS.Tuneb.vbs
Tune.vbs
Kristen.vbs
Mbop!.vbs
VBS.Dream.b.vbs
Cheese.vbs
tripple.vbs
VBS.Rabfu.vbs
VBS.Stuckb.vbs
vbs.dropper.vbs
VBS.Fela.b.vbs
Fela.b.vbs
anna.vbs
VBS.Navigator.vbs
PORN_Madonna.JPEG.vbs
VBS.Trojan.Vanina.b.vbs
vbs.solved.vbs
I-Worm.Noon.vbs
JS.JDV.b.vbs
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IRC-Worm.generic.doc.VBS
VBS.Sheep.VBS
VBS.Cute.vbs
IRC-Worm.generic.vbs.vbs
Welcomb.vbs
IRC-Worm.generic.vbs
VBS.Reality.VBS
VBS.Jesus.vbs
Crystal.c.vbs
I-691D~1.VBS
JS1.vbs
I-Worm.LoveLetter.bk.VBS
VBS.Unreal.vbs
VBS.Bogus.vbs
Bogus.vbs
VBS.Sunfl.vbs
VBS.NMVT.vbs
VBS.Jadra.vbs
Like_A_Virgin.MP3.vbs
JS.Fmtdrv.b.vbs
VBS.LaMEr0nE.vbs
VBS.Hustle.vbs
VBS.ChiQui.vbs
Hustle.vbs
VBS.Harana.vbs
VBS.IntendedDrambui.vbs
VBS.Intended.Drambui.vbs
virus2.vbs
kileer.VBS
VBS.Yozisa.vbs
VBS.Yozis.vbs
Inzane.vbs
VBS.Crystal.b.VBS
Crystal.a1.vbs
VBS.Crystal.c.vbs
Crazzzy.c.vbs
Sheep.vbs
VBS.Bound.vbs
MSBound.vbs
JS.Charlene.vbs
VBS.Crystal.vbs
Crystal.vbs
Crysta.vbs
VBS.Dropper.Apop.vbs
Beware.vbs
VBS.Energ.vbs
IIS -Worm.CodeRed.a.vbs
VBS.Stress.vbs
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Stress.vbs
Stress Out.vbs
VBScript.777.vbs
VBS.777.vbs
IIS -Worm.CodeRed.c.vbs
Seven.vbs
VBS.Vintageb.vbs
sargo.vbs
Jackal.VBS
Osterhase.vbs
MarkerC.vbs
VBS.Trojan.Zirkov.vbs
Trojan.Zirko.vbs
pet_tick.vbs
VBS.Hatred.b.vbs
Hatred.b.vbs
VBS.GaScript.vbs
IRC-Worm.Freenet.VBS
VBS.LostGame.vbs
JS.Hatred.vbs
VBS.Mesut.vbs
VBS.Both.vbs
VBS.Dropper.17th.vbs
Crazzzy.b.vbs
Renegy.vbs
Fasan.vbs
VBS.Yozisb.vbs
VBS.Yozis.b.vbs
thief.vbs
Intended.Yozis.b. vbs
VBS.Phybre.vbs
I-Worm.Lee.o.vbs
VBS.Simona.vbs
Simona.vbs
VBS.Voodoo1b.vbs
VBS.Voodoo.b.vbs
VBS.Vodoo.b.VBS
VBS.Godog.vbs
Falling.vbs
vacuna.vbs
VBS.Netlog.vbs
JS.Internal.f.vbs
VBS.Trojan.Cybers.vbs
NoWarn.vbs
HTML.NoWarn.vbs
VBS.Trojan.Raptor.vbs
Raptor V.vbs
JS.Germinal.vbs
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VBS.Voodoo.vbs
VBS.Vodoo.VBS
VBS.Exposed.vbs
VBS.VbsDoc.vbs
HTMLStertor.vbs
VBS.Petik.vbs
VBS.Trojan.Lava.vbs
dome.vbs
yourworm.vbs
I-Worm.SSIWG.vbs
VBS.Spaced.vbs
VBS.SSIWG.vbs
I-Worm.Sint.src.VBS
VBS.Sflus.vbs
Homepage.vbs
JS.Lame.vbs
Happy.vbs
JS.Evil.vbs
VBS.Coldape.vbs
VBS.AVM.vbs
VBS.Pocus.vbs
VBS.Kremp.VBS
VBS.Internal.vbs
Rato.vbs
fuckosama.vbs
VBS.Lanus.vbs
NEOKILLER.vbs
VBS.Hatred. vbs
Hatred.vbs
VBS.Marata.vbs
HTML.Internal.vbs
AnnaK.vbs
VBS.Weim.vbs
VBS.RTFinfo.vbs
VBS.Entice.vbs
Entice.vbs
WBS.Simple.VBS
Crazzzy.vbs
VBS.Jertva.vbs
JS.Optiz.vbs
VBS.Gum.vbs
VBS.Infi.vbs
madafaka.vbs
Infi.vbs
VBS.Mb.c.VBS
VBS.Madafaka.vbs
Infi.b.vbs
Xxx.vbs
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VBS.Xxx.VBS
VBS.Trojan.Alal.vbs
Eraser.vbs
JS.Funtime.vbs
Simple.vBS
VBS.MailTest.vbs
Yovp.vbs
VBS.Internalc.vbs
VBS.Internal.c.vbs
Internal.vbs
JS.vbs
VBS.Eva.b.vbs
Script.Inf.Demo. vbs
VBS.Nobyl.vbs
VBS.Eva.c.vbs
IIS -Worm.BlueCode.vbs
Script.Inf.Zox.c.vbs
VBS.Lucky2.vbs
VBS.Eva.vbs
Eva.vbs
Script.Inf.Zox.b.vbs
VBS.Rabbit.a.VBS
VBS.Rabbit.c.vbs
VBS.Corrupt.vbs
rabbitC.vbs
Baby.vbs
VBS.Trojan.Over.vbs
Script.HE.Flys.b.vbs
VBS.Rabbit.b.vbs
rabbitB.vbs
VBS.Rabbit.vbs
rabbitA.vbs
VBS.Brat.vbs
VBS.Trojan.Destroyer.Trojan.vbs
Fuck.vbs
JS.DriveFormat.b.vbs
VBS.Readme.vbs
Chantal.vbs
VBS.Pie.b.vbs
Script.HE.Flys.vbs
VBS.Trojan.Debor.vbs
Bored.vbs
Small.vbs
VBS.Birgit.vbs
VBS.First.e.vbs
VBS.First.b.VBS
Stuck.vbs
JS.Fortnight.a.vbs
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melissa.vbs
Script.Inf.Zox.vbs

Normal VBScripts
zoom.vbs
WSH__I386_SHOWVAR.VBS
WSH__I386_SHORTCUT.VBS
WSH__I386_REGISTRY.VBS
WSH__I386_NETWORK.VBS
WSH__I386_EXCEL.VBS
WSH__I386_DELUSERS.VBS
WSH__I386_CHART.VBS
WSH__I386_ADDUSERS.VBS
Write to a Custom Event Log Using EventCreate.vbs
Write Events to the Local Event Log.vbs
Write Events to a Remote Event Log.vbs
Write Data to a Text File.vbs
Win2kReleaseIPRenewIP.vbs
viewpagefilesettings.vbs
View System Restore Configuration Values.vbs
View All Existing Restore Points.vbs
Vier.vbs
version.vbs
Verify that a Folder Exists.vbs
Verify that a File Exists.vbs
Verify Signatures for All Scripts in a Folder.vbs
Verify ChkDsk Volume Status.vbs
VDirHits.vbs
Vbstest21.vbs
Vbstest2.vbs
vbscript.vbs
Using WMI to Enumerate Shortcuts on a Computer.vbs
uservalid.vbs
UserPrintQueues.vbs
UserPrint.vbs
UserLogon.vbs
UserGroups.vbs
UserFileAccess.vbs
UserChangePassWord.vbs
Use WMI to Enumerate Environment Variables.vbs
Use Wildcards in File Queries.vbs
Use Wildcards in a Folder Query.vbs
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Use the Browse for Folder Dialog Box.vbs
Use Recursion to Enumerate Subfolders.vbs
Use a Text File as a Command Line Argument.vbs
Use a Predefined Indexing Service Query.vbs
Use a Free Text Search with the Indexing Service.vbs
Upgrade Software.vbs
update_ifl501.vbs
update_ifl50.vbs
update_icl501.vbs
update_icl50.vbs
update_data_mdb1.vbs
update_data_mdb.vbs
Update Records in a Recordset.vbs
Update Printer Locations.vbs
UnPauseWebServers1.vbs
UnPauseWebServers.vbs
UnPauseServers.vbs
UnPauseFTPServers.vbs
uninstall_admin1.vbs
uninstall_admin.vbs
UNIFLEX.VBS
Uncompress Folders.vbs
U111.VBS
Transfer1.vbs
Transfer.vbs
Transfer Print Jobs to a Different Print Queue.vbs
Track Script Progress Using Internet Explorer.vbs
Track Script Progress in a Command Window.vbs
Top20URIs.vbs
TEXTMASK.vbs
TestOcx2.vbs
TestOcx1.vbs
TestOcx.vbs
testflds1.vbs
testflds.vbs
test_script.vbs
test.vbs
Terminate a Process.vbs
System Event Log Properties.vbs
synciwam.vbs
switchToSourceSafe.vbs
Suppressing Windows Activation Notices.vbs
Suppress Multiple Event Notifications.vbs
submenus98.vbs
StopWebServers.vbs
stopweb.vbs
stopsrv1.vbs
stopsrv.vbs
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stopservice.vbs
StopServers.vbs
StopFTPServers.vbs
stopftp.vbs
Stop the Indexing Service.vbs
Stock.vbs
StaticFilter.vbs
StartWebServers.vbs
startweb.vbs
startsrv1.vbs
startsrv.vbs
startservice.vbs
StartServers.vbs
StartFTPServers.vbs
startftp.vbs
Start the Indexing Service.vbs
standardPro8.vbs
standardPro6.vbs
standardPro5.vbs
standardPro1.vbs
standardPro.vbs
standard.vbs
sssadmin7.vbs
sssadmin6.vbs
SSSADMIN3.VBS
SSSADMIN2.VBS
SSSADMIN1.VBS
sssadmin.vbs
SrcSafe.vbs
SPLINELOGO.vbs
SPINIE.vbs
sp500w98pcmciab001.vbs
SMap_Topframe.vbs
SMap_Menu.vbs
SMap_MainCode.vbs
SMap_LinkCode.vbs
Skin_18.vbs
Skin_17.vbs
Skin_16.vbs
Skin_13.vbs
Skin_12.vbs
Skin_11.vbs
Skin_1.vbs
SIM100_Shared1.vbs
SIM100_Shared.vbs
sign.vbs
Sign All Scripts in a Folder.vbs
Sign a Script Programmatically.vbs
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shutdown.vbs
Shut Down the Local Computer.vbs
SHOWVAR3.VBS
SHOWVAR2.VBS
SHOWVAR1.VBS
SHOWVAR.VBS
show-ids1.vbs
show-ids.vbs
ShowAllRoutingRules.vbs
ShowAllProtocolRules.vbs
SHORTCUT3.VBS
SHORTCUT2.VBS
SHORTCUT1.VBS
SHORTCUT.VBS
SG-PRESERVE.vbs
SG-DRAWINGSURFACE.vbs
SetWebPubRuleHostHeader.vbs
SetUpstreamRouting.vbs
setup1.vbs
setup.vbs
SetTempPath.vbs
SetEmailAlerts.vbs
SetDefaultApplicationSettings.vbs
SetCache.vbs
set_rwin1.vbs
set_rwin.vbs
Set the Default Printer.vbs
Set the Default Printer Based on Queue Length.vbs
Set System Restore Configuration Values.vbs
servicestopped.vbs
SendText.vbs
SendMail1.vbs
SendMail.vbs
Send Email without Installing the SMTP Service.vbs
Send Email from a Script.vbs
Security Log Properties.vbs
SearchTree.vbs
search_for_emails.vbs
search_for_addresses.vbs
Search the Indexing Service.vbs
Search for Specific Printers.vbs
Search for Published Folders.vbs
Search for Computer Accounts.vbs
SCROLLSWITCH.vbs
Script99.vbs
Script5.vbs
Schedule AutoChk.vbs
Schedule a Task.vbs
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RUNNERS.vbs
Run ChkDsk.vbs
Returning Active Directory System Information.vbs
Return a Disk Drive Collection.vbs
Retrieving the Default WMI Namespace.vbs
Retrieve USB Hub Information.vbs
Retrieve USB Controller Information.vbs
Retrieve Time Zone Information for a Computer.vbs
Retrieve the Internet Explorer Connection Summary.vbs
Retrieve the Display Controller Configuration.vbs
Retrieve System Information.vbs
Retrieve Summary Information for a File.vbs
Retrieve Specific Events from an Event Log.vbs
Retrieve SMBIOS Information.vbs
Retrieve Shadow Copy Settings.vbs
Retrieve SCSI Controller Information.vbs
Retrieve Print Queue Statistics.vbs
Retrieve Portable Battery Information.vbs
Retrieve Port Resource Information.vbs
Retrieve PCMCIA Controller Information.vbs
Retrieve Operating System Properties.vbs
Retrieve Motherboard Device Information.vbs
Retrieve Modem Information.vbs
Retrieve Memory Array Information.vbs
Retrieve IP4 Route Table Information.vbs
Retrieve Internet Explorer File Version Information.vbs
Retrieve Internet Explorer Connection Settings.vbs
Retrieve Internet Explorer COM Object Settings.vbs
Retrieve Internet Explorer Cache Settings.vbs
Retrieve Information About Mapped Network Drives.vbs
Retrieve Information About Binary Files Used by an Application.vbs
Retrieve IDE Controller Information.vbs
Retrieve Folder Properties.vbs
Retrieve Floppy Controller Information.vbs
Retrieve File Version Information.vbs
Retrieve File Properties.vbs
Retrieve Extended File Properties.vbs
Retrieve Events For One Day from an Event Log.vbs
Retrieve Detailed Summary Information for a File.vbs
Retrieve Current Display Configuration.vbs
Retrieve Computer Fan Information.vbs
Retrieve Command Line Arguments from an Active Directory Co.vbs
Retrieve Command Line Arguments from a Text File.vbs
retrieve CACHE MEMORY information.vbs
retrieve BIOS information.vbs
retrieve battery information.vbs
Retrieve All Events from an Event Log.vbs
resumeservice.vbs
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Resume the Indexing Service.vbs
Resume Print Jobs.vbs
Resume All Paused Printers.vbs
Resume a Paused Printer.vbs
RestorePointXPCleaner1.vbs
RestorePointXPCleaner.vbs
restart1.vbs
restart.vbs
restart a computer.vbs
resource2_h.vbs
resource1_h.vbs
resource_h.vbs
reseta computer account password.vbs
Report Print Queue Statistics.vbs
Rename Folders.vbs
Rename Files.vbs
Rename a Printer.vbs
Rename a Printer Published in Active Directory.vbs
Rename a Folder.vbs
Rename a File.vbs
rename a computer account1.vbs
rename a computer account.vbs
remove.vbs
remove sw.vbs
Remove an Indexing Service Scope.vbs
Remove an Indexing Service Catalog.vbs
Remove a Printer Connection.vbs
remoteshutdown.vbs
remotereboot.vbs
RemoteFFT.VBS
REGISTRY3.VBS
REGISTRY2.VBS
REGISTRY1.VBS
REGISTRY.VBS
RegFilters.vbs
Receive Notification When a Printer Stops.vbs
reboot.vbs
read_cd_root.vbs
Read String and DWORD Values.vbs
Read Data from a Text File.vbs
Read an Expanded String Value.vbs
Read a Text File into an Array.vbs
Read a Text File from the Bottom Up.vbs
Read a Text File Character by Character.vbs
Read a MultiString Value.vbs
Read a Binary Registry Value.vbs
ras1.vbs
ras.vbs
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Query the Indexing Service for File Names.vbs
Query the Event Log for Stop Events.vbs
Query a Specific Event Log.vbs
Purge a Print Queue.vbs
Publish a Shared Folder.vbs
Programmatically Verify a Script Signature.vbs
process.vbs
prncnfg.vbs
printjobs.vbs
printerstatus.vbs
Prevent AutoChk From Running.vbs
Prevent a Process from Running.vbs
ppt_name.vbs
Post.vbs
Pierwias1.vbs
Pierwias.vbs
Photoshop_shortcut_xp2k.vbs
Perform Actions on Files.vbs
perform a cross-domain.vbs
pcconfig.vbs
PauseWebServers.vbs
pauseweb.vbs
pausesrv.vbs
pauseservice.vbs
PauseServers.vbs
PauseFTPServers.vbs
pauseftp.vbs
Pause the Indexing Service.vbs
Pause Printers with Empty Print Queues.vbs
Pause Print Jobs.vbs
Pause a Printer.vbs
patch.vbs
Parse a Path Name.vbs
Parse a Fixed Width Column Log.vbs
Parse a Comma Separated Values Log.vbs
pagefileconfig.vbs
pagefile.vbs
osinfo.vbs
ntevent.vbs
NSETUPWS.VBS
Notify Users of a Purged Print Queue.vbs
Notepad_shortcut_xp2k.vbs
NewWindow.vbs
NETWORK3.VBS
NETWORK2.VBS
NETWORK1.VBS
NETWORK.VBS
Move Folders Using WMI.vbs
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Move Folders Using the Shell Object.vbs
Move Files.vbs
Move a Set of Files.vbs
Move a Folder.vbs
Move a File.vbs
move a computer account.vbs
mouset.vbs
MOUSERS2.VBS
MOUSERS1.VBS
MOUSERS.VBS
Mount a Volume.vbs
Monitor Volume Change Events.vbs
Monitor Threads.vbs
Monitor the Print Service.vbs
Monitor Registry Subtree Events.vbs
Monitor Registry Subkey Events.vbs
Monitor Registry Entry Level Events.vbs
Monitor Processor Use.vbs
Monitor Processor Use by Process.vbs
Monitor Process Performance.vbs
Monitor Process Deletion. vbs
Monitor Process Creation.vbs
Monitor Process Availability.vbs
Monitor Printers with a Temporary Event Subscription.vbs
Monitor Printer Status.vbs
Monitor Print Queues.vbs
Monitor Print Queue Times.vbs
Monitor Print Job Status.vbs
Monitor Physical Disk Drive Performance.vbs
Monitor Page File Use.vbs
Monitor NTFS File Cache Performance.vbs
Monitor Logical Disk Drive Performance.vbs
Monitor FRS Replication.vbs
Monitor File Modification.vbs
Monitor File Deletion.vbs
Monitor File Creation.vbs
Monitor Event Logs.vbs
Monitor Domain Controller Performance.vbs
Monitor Disk Drive Free Space.vbs
Monitor Disk Bytes Per Second.vbs
Monitor Computer Uptime.vbs
Monitor Computer Health.vbs
Monitor Computer Availability.vbs
Monitor Changes in Service Status.vbs
Monitor Changes in Computer Power Status.vbs
Monitor Available Memory.vbs
Monitor Available Disk Space.vbs
Monitor Active Directory Replication.vbs
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Monitor Active Directory Database Performance.vbs
MOGRP2.VBS
MOGRP1.VBS
MOGRP.VBS
Modify the AutoChk Timeout Value.vbs
modify recovery configuration options.vbs
Modify File System Properties.vbs
Modify File Attributes.vbs
modify a shadow copy storage area.vbs
Modify a Network Share.vbs
Modify a Disk Quota Entry.vbs
mod_user.vbs
mkwebsrv.vbs
mkwebdir.vbs
mkw3site.vbs
mkftpsite.vbs
mkftpdir.vbs
MimeMaps.vbs
Migan1.vbs
Migan.vbs
MetaBackRest1.vbs
metabackrest.vbs
MetaBackEnum.vbs
MetaBackDel.vbs
MetaBack1.vbs
metaback.vbs
memory.vbs
MEGA.vbs
mc1.vbs
mc.vbs
Mask Passwords Using Internet Explorer.vbs
Mask Command Line Passwords.vbs
Map All Network Shares to Local Folders.vbs
Map a Network Share to a Local Folder.vbs
machinename.vbs
lznac1.vbs
lznac.vbs
LVDemo.VBS
LoveCleaner1.vbs
LoveCleaner.vbs
Lotto.vbs
logfix3.vbs
logfix2.vbs
logfix1.vbs
logfix.vbs
logenum.vbs
listservices.vbs
ListServers.vbs
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listnetworkprotocols.vbs
Listing7_OUAnlegen2.vbs
Listing7_OUAnlegen1.vbs
Listing7_OUAnlegen.vbs
Listing6_Benutzeranlegen1.vbs
Listing6_Benutzeranlegen.vbs
Listing5_Query1.vbs
Listing5_Query.vbs
Listing4_Benutzerliste_Standardcontainer1.vbs
Listing4_Benutzerliste_Standardcontainer.vbs
Listing3_WellKnownObjects.vbs
Listing2_GUID.vbs
Listing1_Partionen.vbs
listeventsbycode.vbs
listeventlogfiles.vbs
ListDeniedMethods.vbs
List Registry Files.vbs
LINKS.VBS
libhdr.vbs
launcher1.vbs
launcher.vbs
LangVer.vbs
LabVIEW_FFT.VBS
Kontrol1.vbs
Kontrol.vbs
join computer domain.vbs
iss.vbs
ISAInfo.vbs
InstCtrs.vbs
install_admin.vbs
install sw on the local computer.vbs
install sw on a remote computer.vbs
Install Printer Ports.vbs
Install Printer Drivers.vbs
Install Multiple Printers for One Print Device.vbs
install computer hw.vbs
Install Active Directory Database Performance Counters.vbs
Install a Printer.vbs
Install a Printer Driver not Found in Drivers Cab.vbs
ims5.vbs
ims4.vbs
ims3.vbs
ims2.vbs
ims1.vbs
ims.vbs
image.vbs
iisftp.vbs
iiscfg1.vbs
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iiscfg.vbs
IHelpUtil.vbs
identifyprocessor type.vbs
Identifying the Owner of a Group.vbs
Identifying Attributes that are Both Indexed and in the Glo.vbs
identify windows product activation status.vbs
identify THE LATEST INSTALLED SERVICE PACK.vbs
Identify the Indexing Service State.vbs
Identify the File System Type.vbs
Identify Shell Object Verbs.vbs
identify os.vbs
identify FSMO ROLES.vbs
Identify Drive Types.vbs
identify domain controller.vbs
identify a global catalog server.vbs
identify a computer roles.vbs
identify a computer roles. using services.vbs
identify a computer chassis.vbs
HOST_BAN.VBS
Hex1.vbs
Hex.vbs
hello.vbs
hehe.vbs
hdr1.vbs
hdr.vbs
Hangman.vbs
HackerScan.vbs
GTHRLOG.VBS
GLOBE.vbs
global.vbs
ghdr1.vbs
ghdr.vbs
GetWebPage.vbs
getnetworkadapterconfig.vbs
getbootconfig.vbs
getappboost.vbs
get the results of the last system remoter.vbs
Generate a File Name.vbs
general.vbs
ftp1.vbs
ftp. vbs
FpcCfg.vbs
FORMS.VBS
Format a Volume.vbs
fix1.vbs
fix.vbs
findweb.vbs
FindScheduledContentDownload.vbs
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Finding Folders by Date.vbs
Find a Record in a Recordset.vbs
FILTER.vbs
filefind.vbs
FetchUrl.vbs
fcountry1.vbs
fcountry.vbs
Favorites.vbs
fastplay.vbs
Fade_text.vbs
ExtendSchema.vbs
EXCEL5.VBS
EXCEL3.VBS
EXCEL2.VBS
EXCEL1.VBS
EXCEL.VBS
evtquery.vbs
eventquery.vbs
Event Log Properties.vbs
eshmts.vbs
ErrorHandler.vbs
ErrorCodes.vbs
Enumerating WMI Providers.vbs
Enumerating WMI Namespaces.vbs
Enumerating User Accounts on the Local Computer.vbs
Enumerating the Dial-In Property Configuration for a User A.vbs
Enumerating Qualifiers for a WMI Class.vbs
Enumerating Properties, Methods, and Qualifiers for a WMI Class.vbs
Enumerating Properties for a WMI Class.vbs
Enumerating Local Groups and Their Members.vbs
Enumerating Group Members.vbs
Enumerating Floppy Disk Drive Properties.vbs
Enumerating Dynamic Classes in WMI.vbs
Enumerating Disk Space by User on the Local Computer.vbs
Enumerating Disk Quotas on the Local Computer.vbs
Enumerating Disk Quota Settings on the Local Computer.vbs
Enumerating COM+ Partition Sets.vbs
Enumerating CD-ROM Properties.vbs
Enumerating Auxiliary Classes.vbs
Enumerating Audit Permissions for a User Account.vbs
Enumerating All WMI Namespaces.vbs
Enumerating All the User Accounts in an NT 4.0 Domain.vbs
Enumerating All the Attributes of an Active Directory Class.vbs
Enumerating Abstract Classes in WMI.vbs
EnumerateUser.vbs
enumerateserial port config properties.vbs
enumerateserial port properties.vbs
enumerateall domain controllers.vbs

143

enumerate WMI settings.vbs
Enumerate Volume Properties.vbs
Enumerate Volume Mount Points.vbs
enumerate video controller.vbs
Enumerate Trust Relationships.vbs
enumerate thephysical memory.vbs
Enumerate the Subfolders of a Folder.vbs
Enumerate the Names of Objects in the Configuration Container.vbs
enumerate the codec files on a computer.vbs
enumerate the boot config properties.vbs
enumerate system slot.vbs
Enumerate Subkeys.vbs
Enumerate Subfolders in a Folder.vbs
enumerate start menu.vbs
enumerate start menu prog groups.vbs
Enumerate Special Folders.vbs
enumerate sound card.vbs
enumerate shadow copy providers.vbs
Enumerate Scheduled Tasks.vbs
enumerate RSOP sessions .vbs
enumerate RSOP appls .vbs
enumerate Resultant user privilege right.vbs
enumerate Resultant system services.vbs
enumerate Resultant set of policyGPOs.vbs
enumerate Resultant set of policy RSop.vbs
enumerate Resultant set of policy links.vbs
enumerate Resultant set of policy group.vbs
enumerate Resultant set of policy audit policies .vbs
enumerate Resultant set of policy administrative .vbs
enumerate Resultant security settings numeric.vbs
enumerate Resultant security settings boolean.vbs
enumerate Resultant scopes.vbs
enumerate Resultant event log1.vbs
enumerate Resultant event log.vbs
Enumerate Registry Values and Types.vbs
enumerate registry properties.vbs
enumerate recovery configuration options.vbs
Enumerate Published Shares.vbs
enumerate program groups.vbs
enumerate progIDs.vbs
enumerate processor information.vbs
Enumerate Printer Port Properties.vbs
Enumerate Printer Drivers.vbs
Enumerate Printer Connections.vbs
Enumerate Printer Capabilities.vbs
enumerate port connector.vbs
enumerate pointing device properties.vbs
enumerate plug and play signed drives.vbs
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enumerate plug and play devices.vbs
enumerate physical memory.vbs
Enumerate Physical Disk Properties.vbs
enumerate parallel port.vbs
Enumerate Page File Properties.vbs
enumerate onboard devices.vbs
Enumerate NTFS Properties.vbs
Enumerate Network Shares.vbs
enumerate memory devices.vbs
Enumerate Logical Disk Drive Properties.vbs
enumerate keyboard.vbs
enumerate IRQ settings.vbs
enumerate internet explorer security zone settings.vbs
enumerate internet explorer security summary settings.vbs
enumerate internet explorer LAN settings .vbs
enumerate installed software features .vbs
enumerate installed software .vbs
enumerate installed or advertised components .vbs
enumerate installed hot fixes .vbs
Enumerate Indexing Service Scopes.vbs
Enumerate Indexing Service Catalogs.vbs
Enumerate Folders Using Dates.vbs
Enumerate Folder Properties.vbs
Enumerate Folder Attributes.vbs
Enumerate Floppy Drives.vbs
Enumerate File Properties.vbs
Enumerate File Attributes.vbs
Enumerate Domain Information for Trust Partners.vbs
enumerate dma channel information .vbs
Enumerate Disk Space by User Using Disk Quotas.vbs
Enumerate Disk Quotas.vbs
Enumerate Disk Quota Settings.vbs
Enumerate Disk Partition Properties.vbs
Enumerate Disk Drive Properties Using FSO.vbs
Enumerate Dfs Targets.vbs
Enumerate Dfs Nodes.vbs
enumerate device memory addresses .vbs
enumerate desktop settings.vbs
enumerate desktop monitor.vbs
enumerate dcom applications .vbs
enumerate dcom application settings .vbs
enumerate computer startup options .vbs
enumerate computer startup commands .vbs
enumerate computer bus.vbs
enumerate computer baseboard.vbs
enumerate computer accounts in active directory .vbs
enumerate computer account attributes .vbs
enumerate component categories .vbs
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enumerate classic com class settings.vbs
enumerate classic com class .vbs
Enumerate Available Disk Space.vbs
enumerate allowable video controller.vbs
Enumerate All the Folders on a Computer.vbs
Enumerate All the Files on a Computer.vbs
Enumerate All the Files in a Folder.vbs
enumerate all shadow copy storage area.vbs
enumerate all shadow copies on a computer.vbs
Enumerate All Published Printers.vbs
Enumerate Administrative Tools.vbs
Enumerate Active Directory Database Replication Partners.vbs
Enumerate a Specific Set of Folders.vbs
Enumerate a Specific Set of Files.vbs
enterprise_destination.vbs
Ensure that an Account Will Not Expire.vbs
Ensure that All Drives are Ready.vbs
Enabling Remote Control Settings for a User Account.vbs
Enabling Disk Quotas on the Local Computer.vbs
Enabling DHCP.vbs
Enabling a User to Logon at Any Time.vbs
enableDHCP.vbs
ENABLECHECKPOINTS.VBS
Enable WINS for All Network Adapters.vbs
Enable Terminal Services.vbs
Enable Terminal Services Session Directory.vbs
Enable Terminal Services Password Prompt.vbs
Enable Terminal Services Active Desktop.vbs
Enable Terminal Service Connections.vbs
Enable Single Session Terminal Service Sessions.vbs
Enable PMTU Discovery on all Network Adapters.vbs
Enable IPSec on a Network Adapter.vbs
Enable IPFilter Security on All Network Adapters.vbs
Enable Forcible Terminal Services Logoff.vbs
Enable DNS on All Network Adapters.vbs
Enable Disk Quotas.vbs
Enable Dead Gateway Detection for All Network Adapters.vbs
Enable a UserAccountControl Flag.vbs
Enable a User Account.vbs
enable a global catalog server.vbs
enable a full system restore.vbs
drives1.vbs
drives.vbs
domainname.vbs
dnsserver.vbs
dnsrecord. vbs
DnsImport.vbs
dnsdomainname.vbs
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disptree.vbs
dispnode.vbs
DisplayProperty.vbs
Display User Account Password Attributes.vbs
Display the Six IADs Properties of a Domain Object.vbs
Display Tabular Output in a Command Window.vbs
Display Real Time Events in a Command Window.vbs
Display Password Property Attributes.vbs
Display One List of all Attributes that are Single Valued a.vbs
Display Domain Password Attributes.vbs
dispatcher1.vbs
Dispatcher.vbs
Dismount a Volume.vbs
Disabling the 'Smartcard Required' Attribute for a User Account.vbs
Disabling a Local User Account.vbs
DisableScheduledContentDownloads.vbs
disableDHCP.vbs
Disable the User Cannot Change Password Option.vbs
disable full system restore.vbs
Disable a User Account.vbs
Disable a Password Flag.vbs
Disable a global catalog derver.vbs
DFoot.vbs
DevStu.vbs
Determining Whether Attributes are Indexed and in the Globa.vbs
Determining Whether an Account Exists in a Windows NT 4.0 Domain.vbs
Determining When a User Account Expires.vbs
Determining UTC Time.vbs
determining time zone offset from Greenich mean time.vbs
Determining the Primary Group for a User Account.vbs
Determining the Parent Class of an Active Directory Object.vbs
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